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Peace at Hitler's Price

Mussolini's peace proposal was additional evidence that he is still firmly tied to Hitler. It was just the speech Der Führer would have wanted, the speech he himself would have made at Danzig had not Great Britain spoiled it in advance by announcing she would fight on until Hitlerism was destroyed. Mussolini's suggestions got the same answer, although the German and Italian peoples are not allowed to know it. Now there are reports that the peace drive will be renewed, perhaps with an offer by Hitler himself to give up his post as Chancellor, since the Treaty of Versailles has been wiped out, and go back to painting—which he said the other day is his real ambition.

There is no reason why such an offer, if made, should be considered for a moment by the French and British. An "appeasement" faction survives in both countries, but it would certainly be overruled by the public at large. If Hitler "retired" voluntarily it would mean no more than it does when a South American dictator declines renomination in favor of one of his friends. Hitler would merely become the power behind the throne. His policies would continue; within six months it is probable that the Allies would confront another threat of war if they did not give up Alsace-Lorraine or consent to the seizure of territory from Belgium or Denmark or in Africa or the South Seas.

The War Is Not a Phony

The chief reason why Americans take seriously reports of a possible new appeasement is because they continue to believe that the Allies are not really trying. For their benefit, a few facts may be set down categorically:

1. Both the British and French censorships have ruthlessly cut off the news. It is quite possible that activity has been much more intense than we are permitted to know.

2. It takes a long time, longer than most laymen realize, to get an army into battle position, especially when part of the force has to be ferried across the English Channel. The length of time is increased, not diminished, when occupying a heavily fortified area such as the Maginot Line.

3. The German Westwall, like the Maginot Line, is almost impregnable. This was true even when it was thinly held, before Hitler had rushed his troops and air force from Poland. Experts say it would cost the lives of four or five hundred thousand men, perhaps a million, to break through. If the effort failed, it might mean losing the war. No commander would be justified in taking such a risk until he had lost all hope of winning in any other way.

4. The British and French air forces combined are no stronger than the German, and perhaps weaker, although they are coming up rapidly. Anti-aircraft work is now very effective on both sides. Attempts at large-scale bombing of military objectives within Germany might result in the loss of so many planes as to be a disaster.

The real character of the war is not yet determined because there are so many unknown factors. If Hitler decides to come through Switzerland, Belgium or the

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Netherlands—or if the Allies make a similar choice—the struggle will fall into a definite pattern with a great increase in activity. Of tremendous importance is what Turkey and Rumania decide to do; to a large extent the war is still being fought in the chancelleries. In their military operations, the combatants are like boxers in the first round, feeling each other out, trying to find the weakest point. For the Allies, this constitutes ordinary good sense. It does not mean that they are about to make peace with Hitlerism and resume the nightmare that was Europe for so many months before September 1.

The Allies' War Aims

From the American point of view, nothing the British and French could do would be more effective than to say now what are their war aims and possible peace terms. To be sure, the basis of a durable peace is an enormously complicated and difficult matter, as George Soule pointed out in The New Republic of September 20. It will take many months of the hardest kind of thinking by the best brains available to write even a rough formula under which Europe can live and breathe after hostilities have ceased. In the meantime, however, there is a great deal that could be said by the British and French and that ought to be said, as to the sort of world they envisage when the soldiers have laid down their arms. Do they really want a lasting peace? Or do they want to crush Germany so that she will again be dominated by a passion for revenge, will elevate a new Adolf Hitler to power and will start fighting again after another quarter of a century?

A point of special interest to Americans is that of secret treaties among the Allies, incompatible with a just and lasting peace. In World War I, the Americans were told they were fighting for justice and democracy and it later turned out that England, France and their allies had written a group of secret treaties which made a just settlement virtually impossible. They certainly negated Wilson's Fourteen Points, on a basis of which the Armistice was signed.

Up to now France, so far as we know, has made no indication of her war aims except that she wants victory. Great Britain has said she proposes to destroy Hitlerism, but you could do that and still write a very bad peace, as was done in 1919 after "Kaiserism" had been destroyed. If this is a war for democratic principles, there can be no harm in saying so. And if it isn't, it is all the more important that Americans should know it.

Giant in the Earth

It is hard to believe that Sigmund Freud is dead, and in some ways harder still to believe that he ever lived. This being an age of collective activities, people hesitate to admit that a single man could radically change our picture of human life and the human mind. Yet Freud did exactly that, with his researches into the unconscious. One may say, of course, that much of his early work was based on discoveries by others, notably Charcot in Paris and Breuer in Vienna. One may say that his mature work fitted into a general tendency of modern science, that is, to study men as struggling and desiring creatures rather than intellectual creatures (*homo sapiens* being replaced by *homo volens*). One may say, finally, that much of his later work was not so much scientific as metaphysical and even mythological. Yet with all these admissions made, it remains true that Freud has exercised a deeper influence on modern thought than anyone else since Marx and Darwin.

All his life he remained aloof from politics, but politics did not pay him back in kind. When Hitler seized Germany, his books were burned. When Hitler seized Austria, his private fortune was confiscated and Freud himself, at the age of eighty-two, was badgered by minor Nazi officials. Finally he was rescued from Vienna, after a Greek princess had ransomed him for 250,000 Austrian schillings. His death at midnight on September 23, in a city darkened for fear of Nazi air raids, is a parable of what is happening to the intellectual life all over Europe.

The Peasants' War

The Russian invasion of eastern Poland has been the occasion for a social revolution, as violent as such revolutions always are. The peasants are seizing the great manors, like that of the Radziwills with its 225,000 acres. They are burning the manor houses; they are killing the lords and ladies of the manors, or turning them over for trial to the newly constituted village soviets. Polish soldiers escaping over the Hungarian border report that they were hunted and harried by Ukrainian bands. A Polish priest in Rumania asserts that he saw forty Catholic seminarists lined against a wall and shot. The firing squad was not composed of godless Russian communists, but of Greek Orthodox peasants.

And that explains the ferocity of the struggle: it is not only social but national and religious. In eastern Poland—which will henceforth be known as western Byelo-Russia and the western Ukraine—the landlords and government officials have been Polish Catholics; the landless peasants are racially either Byelo (White) Russians or Ukrainians, and by religion either Greek Orthodox or Uniat. The hatred between the two classes goes back at least three hundred years, to the days of the peasant revolt under Bogdan Chmielnicki, when Ukrainians were slaughtered by thousands, and the Polish landlords they captured were transfixed and left to die slowly on sharpened stakes. Throughout eastern Europe such memories are the stuff of daily life.

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Poland Will Rise Again

The Red Army is moving into eastern Poland as if it meant to stay there. It is not confining itself to a mere "agricultural reform," as some observers have stated; on the contrary, it is trying to bolshevize the country. Just behind the skirmish lines are communist speakers, theatres, movies and officials, all speaking to the peasants in their own language, all exhorting them to follow communist models. And the exhortations are likely to be heeded, at least in those districts where the Poles have been a ruling and hated minority. But as they approach Warsaw, the Russians will meet with greater resistance, for there most of the land is held by peasant proprietors, stubbornly individualistic, stubbornly Polish and stubbornly Catholic. The Germans, too, will have their troubles. So far they have been acting the traditional role of the ruthless invader—a role that the Poles have learned to resist through centuries of invasion.

Whoever wins this war, Poland will rise again, as she has risen in the past. But this time she will be a different nation, a Poland of the peasants, the factory workers and the middle class. She will no longer be ruled by the "magnates" who were the curse both of the old Polish kingdom and the post-war republic. The nobles will have lost those vast estates on which their power rested. Most of them will survive as individuals, but they will disappear as a class, together with their age-old dream of conquering and colonizing the Ukraine.

Prussian Guardsman

Of course there are all sorts of stories about the death of Colonel General Werner von Fritsch near Warsaw. They start from a natural wonder that the idol of the Reichswehr, a brilliant soldier and until recently chief of staff, should be placed in an advanced and dangerous position. It had been thought that when Hitler indicated his respect for von Fritsch by making him honorary commander of an artillery regiment the General was back in favor. The official German version shows clearly that this was not the case; he was at the front only in his honorary capacity, without a command, and the Germans say that in his disappointment he voluntarily accompanied a risky reconnaissance party. The Warsaw radio has announced that German prisoners say he was assassinated by the Gestapo, but this sounds too much like a propaganda story. The death of von Fritsch must be a disappointment to those British circles, which, it is widely rumored, are hoping for a coup that will overthrow Hitler but prevent a democratic or socialist revolution in Germany. He had both the prestige and the ability to be a "strong-man" successor to the Nazis. Hitler no doubt knew this. It is hard to believe that he regrets von Fritsch's death, but to say that is not—even in the case of Hitler—to say that he had him killed.

'Ware the War Boom

The United States Chamber of Commerce has added its voice to those that are warning the country against a war boom. The note of caution is well taken. The sudden bulge in prices immediately after September 1 was largely a housewives' panic; there was no real shortage of anything, but purchases which cleaned out the retailers' shelves also depleted the stocks of wholesalers and perhaps of some producers. Taking the world as a whole, there is a tremendous surplus in nearly every primary commodity overhanging the market. Shipping resources are limited, ability to buy is restricted, and there is no reason to believe that the price of such things as cotton, wheat and sugar will be substantially higher a year hence than they are now.

The Wall Street boom, like the housewives' scare, is largely psychological. All the lambs who were sheared in 1929 and in 1937 have rushed into the market to be shorn again. Behind all this, however, there is a solid improvement in business in many lines. It cannot be based on war orders, for these were of little importance before and have almost stopped since the President invoked the Neutrality Act. It is partly based on export orders from neutral countries which can no longer depend on Britain or Germany as a source of supply. But most of it is purely American. We might very well have had a boom this fall, war or not; the deficit in consumers' goods is now considerable, and the banks of course are bursting with credit. Unluckily, we shall never know what the autumn of 1939 would have been like without war.

Far Eastern Front

The war in Europe has driven Oriental affairs off the front page, but not out of existence. Immediately after Russia signed the armistice with Japan, thereby giving her a free hand, she began hurrying her crack troops down from the Siberian border into China. A heavy attack has been made on Changsha, in South Central China, in which it is reported that 20,000 men were killed, about equally divided between Japanese and Chinese. Changsha will probably fall, if it hasn't already, and the Japanese will get the ruins of the city, which was burned by the Chinese some time ago. Japanese planes are bombing numerous towns in Fukien Province, as part of the persistent Japanese effort to make the Chinese love and coöperate with them. There are stories of a major advance by the Japanese up the railroad from Canton to Hankow. Meanwhile, Tokyo denies all these happenings. Japan's only aim now, says Foreign Minister Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, is to encourage the friendship of the United States. We hope she doesn't use the same means she has employed in China.

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Keeping Our Liberties

It is a compliment to American level-headedness that, although the war has been going on for nearly a month now, we have heard no one refer to the Germans as Huns, or otherwise identify Hitler with the whole body of the German people. Nevertheless, we are still keeping a shingle handy to use on the seat of the pants of the first person we hear refer to hamburger as "Liberty Steak." It is not only that we are opposed to the stupidity of condemning one nation for a tragedy as terrible to it as to the rest of the world, but that we are so fearful of what this kind of thinking will mean to America's civil liberties.

Once let us begin to suspect any man with a heavy accent of being a Nazi spy—though he's probably a refugee—and we are on the way to alien and sedition laws, to Red-hunts and union-busting. Representative Adolph Sabath, the chairman of the House Rules Committee, was quite right in saying the other day that the war abroad will be used by Tories to attempt to scare through the anti-alien laws that are waiting congressional decision. One of these—already passed by the House—is the Hobbs Concentration Camp Bill, which introduces the principle of imprisonment for life without trial. It will affect few aliens, but its sponsors look forward to extending the principle in future. Anyone who advocates such a law, "just for Nazis," is really recommending that we adopt Nazi principles.

Kansas Politician Talking

Naturally Mr. Alf Landon is strongly opposed to a third term for President Roosevelt; as a leading Republican he was opposed to any term at all. He is certainly free to express his sentiments in this respect whenever he pleases, but he seems to have done himself a bad turn by choosing this moment to repeat them publicly, and by arguing that Mr. Roosevelt would take the fight over the munitions embargo "out of politics" if he announced now that he will not be a candidate in 1940. It is hard to follow Mr. Landon's reasoning. For if there are Senators or Representatives who will vote on this issue simply in order to be for or against Mr. Roosevelt—and probably there are some—they are likely to do it whether or not he rules out his future candidacy.

The bad turn Mr. Landon has done himself is to make it appear that he is dragging partisan politics into the neutrality debate, rather than trying to keep them out. He indicates that he is not opposed to the President's proposals for amending the neutrality laws, but that he thinks the 1940 elections are the biggest current issue. That may be the way a Republican leader looks at it, but to many Americans who are worrying about the best way to keep this country out of war it will seem that Mr. Landon is trying to make political capital out of a national emergency.

Exile's Return

It's good for Columbia University and a good omen for the rest of us that Professor Charles A. Beard is rejoining the Columbia faculty as visiting professor of Government. He resigned twenty-two years ago, during the last world war, because the university, acting as foolishly as most colleges did at that time, hysterically discharged two professors for teaching doctrines "disloyal" to an America at war. We hope his return may signify that Columbia and the rest of America's colleges will keep their heads through the conflicts and emotions of the new holocaust. Incidentally, now that Dr. Beard has returned to Columbia, his name might also appear in new editions of that valuable reference work, "The Columbia Encyclopedia," from which it has so far been conspicuously absent.

Cash and Carry!

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ADDRESS to Congress on the repeal of the arms embargo was not in his best vein. It sounded as though it might have been rewritten from two previous drafts, one of which stressed the return to the principles of international law while the other emphasized the desirability of cash-and-carry. The President was on weak ground when he asked that the embargo be repealed because to do so would aid employment, by putting people to work in munitions factories. It is altogether likely that he will be disappointed in his request for a large degree of executive discretion in administering the terms of the revised law (assuming that Congress agrees to change it). There is a rather widespread feeling that the President is impulsive, reckless and strongly in favor of Great Britain and France, and that these qualities, taken together, might constitute a danger. On the whole, however, we feel that the President was right and that the measures he proposes should be adopted. A majority of the people seems to feel the same way.

The debate in which this nation is now engaged is probably the most important in our history, yet it has begun in a disappointing manner. On both sides there is a tendency to set up fetishes and to talk in slogans that are divorced from reality. Those who favor repeal of the arms embargo sometimes speak as though this action would itself ensure a prompt victory of the Allies, which is nonsense, or suggest that if repeal had been put through long ago it would have prevented the war, which is equally nonsense. The isolationists who are fighting repeal make the opposite mistake, of assuming that if we don't sell munitions we shall surely keep out of war and that if we do, we shan't—two assumptions that are without foundation.

We can find no excuse for the isolationists' failure to recognize the fact that we are already selling large

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quantities of important war supplies to England and France, that we are using American ships and American sailors to transport them and that such shipments constitute a peril. The distinction between other types of materials and guns and ammunition is an unreal one. Soldiers need food just as badly as they need rifles. Cotton, copper, steel and wheat may be more essential at a given moment than airplanes or tanks. Yet so far as we know, none of the isolationists proposes that we should suspend all trade with England and France. They are well aware that if we tried it, we should throw our economy into confusion and bring great suffering to many thousands of people. The pressure for a resumption of trade would then become very strong, perhaps irresistible. The isolationists dodge the issue of cash-and-carry, which Mr. Borah dismissed the other day with the remark that it is of minor importance. On the contrary, it is far more important than the question whether we shall add to this tremendous volume of trade that is now in progress the items of arms and ammunition.

There is no automatic insurance against our going to war. The American people are fairly hot-headed and are quite capable of demanding action in terms that Congress could not withstand. Huge propaganda efforts will be made by the belligerents on both sides, and the activities of the British and French are likely to be enormously more effective than those of the Germans. The surveys of the Institute of Public Opinion and Fortune Magazine already show a rapidly hardening sentiment in this country in favor of the Allies. Only a tiny percentage of individuals have said they were in favor of going to war at present; but when the question was changed to read, "Would you favor going to war if the Allies seemed to be losing?" there was a tremendous increase. The Institute of Public Opinion found that 57 percent of the people are now in favor of selling arms and ammunition on a cash-and-carry basis, whereas opinion was equally divided on this subject just before the war broke out.

In the light of these facts, the isolationists would seem to be juggling dynamite. If the Allies should presently appear to be losing, and if at the same time our people felt that we were doing less than we reasonably could to aid them, the reaction in their favor might easily compel a declaration of war. A limited assistance now, under the cash-and-carry system, would serve to canalize that emotion and help proportionately to reduce the risk of embroilment. Instead, the isolationists seem satisfied to have an unlimited number of American ships risk carrying contraband through the war zones. They sweep aside the powerful effect that attacks on our shipping had in bringing us into the First World War. Their pacifism is of the emotional variety which accepts the slogan, "No munitions for anybody," as a substitute for thought. We cannot afford at this juncture to act on this intellectual level.

Be Ready for M-Day!

EVER SINCE THE LAST WAR, military specialists and others have been concerned about how to avoid the mistakes we made then if we ever got into another war. In pursuance of this concern, the National Defense Act of 1920 and other legislation dealing with the same subject has been passed, and the War and Navy Departments have been working on an Industrial Mobilization Plan. The first edition of this was published in 1931, it was revised in 1933 and 1936, and the last revision—that of 1939—has recently been issued.

Liberals have been worried about this activity for a number of reasons. They felt, first, that active economic preparations for war would help to push us into one. They discovered with alarm, for instance, that widespread surveys of industrial plants had been made and that many of them had received sealed orders, to be opened when war was declared. This seemed like direct reinforcement of the impulse to bring about war so that large profits could be made. They also were distrustful of the plans to regiment our economic activity the moment war broke out, in view of the fact that those in control would be likely to be representative of big business and banking. It seemed like a threat to install a business dictatorship, safeguarding profits at the expense of labor and consumers.

What are the facts about the law and the plans? The law gives the President almost dictatorial powers, not only when war comes, but when a national emergency is declared. It does not specify in great detail on the economic side how these powers should be used. President Wilson last time received such powers—some by act of Congress and some merely by his constitutional position and by general consent. Modern war cannot be fought without a good deal of concentration of power in the executive. The main intent of the law is harmless enough—to prepare for such an eventuality in advance, in order to avoid wasting weeks or months in fumbling. Anybody who does not like the idea of giving tremendously broad powers to the President ought to devote his attention to keeping the country out of war.

The Industrial Mobilization Plan itself is in the main a suggested organization of the war effort, which the President may adopt *in toto*, modify as he sees fit, or discard entirely for some other type of control. It is, for the most part, modeled on the organization which we developed, after great travail and confusion, toward the end of the last war. Its main objective is to obtain adequate munitions and supplies for the army and navy as promptly as possible, and to plan for the exercise of such control of our economic life as will aid prosecution of a war.

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The army and navy some years ago set up, as a permanent organization, a Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, to coördinate their demands for supplies, plan for the impact of war requirements on industrial capacity and resources, and avoid competition with each other for limited stocks or use of productive equipment. This board has also done a good deal to standardize the devices used by the two services in order to avoid waste. Anyone who remembers the competition and confusion in military purchasing at the beginning of the last war, and the long struggle for a Ministry of Munitions in Britain and a unified purchasing agency here, will see why it is well to have this sort of office set up and operating—in peace as well as during hostilities.

The Plan recommends in addition a super-organization, to be erected for the period of the emergency whenever it is required. This is to be, not under the War or Navy Department, but directly under the President. At the head is to be an Administrator of War Resources, with an Advisory Council. Under him will be the War Resources Administration. Through this the President is to exercise many of his extraordinary powers, such as priority, conservation, commandeering. These are to be applied through separate sections on facilities, commodities, power and fuel, and transportation. The whole affair is similar to our War Industries Board in the last war, except that it seems also to bring under the same head other former emergency agencies, such as the food, fuel and railroad administrations.

Coördinate bodies are suggested, with a somewhat undefined relationship to the War Resources Administration, to administer war control of finance, foreign trade, labor and prices.

The plan does not contemplate abolishing activities of any of the regular government departments or agencies. It recognizes that power to do much that would have to be done is already in their hands; in this respect the situation is entirely different from that existing in 1917. It conceives the emergency agency to be one that will coördinate their activities and supplement them in certain respects, rather than one that will supplant them.

Where, then, lies the danger in this scheme? We do not think it can successfully be maintained that something of the sort will not be necessary if we get into war. Nor is there any harm—but rather a great deal of good—in having such plans on paper and thoroughly discussed beforehand. We do not object to the invention and perfection of new guns and planes in time of peace; we don't have to use them just because we know how to make them. Thought on war industrial organization is certainly no less necessary and no more perilous. The uncertainty lies rather in the selection of those who are to exercise the control. What are their objectives and preconceptions likely to be? It is one thing to say that a labor administration and a price-control agency are necessary in war, but quite another to know precisely what they would mean in practice. War labor control might mean anything from conscription to encouragement of collective bargaining, and prices might be set either to give exorbitant profits or to increase the general standard of living.

The fears of the liberals seemed to be confirmed in this respect when the President appointed, at the suggestion of the War Department, as members of the suggested Advisory Committee to the War Munitions Board, a group of big business men headed by Mr. Stettinius, chairman of United States Steel. No doubt these gentlemen are sincerely patriotic and want to do their best to help the country in a possible war. The question concerns rather their associations and general conditioning. They are hardly the men whom one would elect to govern the economic life of the country.

Protection against the possible danger lies completely in the hands of Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers. It is up to him to decide whether to declare the existence of an emergency (he has already declared a "limited" one). It is up to him to decide how his war powers shall be administered, if the test comes. There is no more important concern of the New Deal and the interests it represents than to take thought and act, now before it is too late, in order not to let the inevitable powers drift into the wrong hands. The army and navy cannot be blamed for wanting a smooth operation of supply. The big business men cannot be blamed for wanting to help. If nobody else is prepared to exercise the power, they will do it. But we see no reason why a democratic government which has held other aims should meekly resign in their favor.

The Partition of Poland

POLAND has now been divided between Germany and Russia, with the Russians getting far more than anyone expected they would. The line has been drawn roughly north and south through Warsaw, which gives Russia substantially more than one-half of the total area. To be sure, Germany gets the industrialized western part of the country, with about two-thirds of the total population. The USSR takes over the farms of the Polish Ukraine, the marshlands and much uninhabited forest country. Nevertheless, Russia's share is huge. German soldiers will have to fall back, in some cases a hundred miles, to get within the new frontier. Germany will not have a common border with Rumania; instead, Russia will be dangerously close to Hungary, which has recognized that fact by hastily planning to set up diplomatic relations with Moscow. Russia and Lithuania will be in contact for the first time.

Russia's share of Poland is so huge that German

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spokesmen hurriedly explained that the new frontier is for temporary military purposes and not intended to be permanent. But do they know anything about it? Does Hitler himself? It is perfectly possible that there was no secret annex to the non-aggression treaty; that Hitler did not know exactly what Stalin would do and still doesn't; that he is pretending there is a good understanding between Moscow and Berlin, for its moral effect on the Allies, but that in fact he is as much in the dark as anyone else.

In terms of his own ambition, Hitler has paid a steep price for "immobilizing" Soviet Russia. He has lost the access to Rumania through Poland that he had hoped to get. His plans to annex both the Polish and the Russian Ukraine are balked, unless he is prepared to fight the Russians as well as the British and French. Ironically enough, both Germany and Russia have taken those parts of Poland that they least need. Germany, heavily industrialized and requiring foodstuffs, gets the industrialized section of Poland. Soviet Russia, which has vast quantities of farmland but is short on industry, gets the agricultural part of the country, with a few factories in the new Central Industrial Region. Russia needed the textile plants of Lodz; Germany got them. Germany needed oil, but Russia, with oil of her own, was given the East Galician wells in addition. This unbalanced division will not matter greatly if the non-aggression treaty turns out to be in fact an alliance. If on the other hand, as many people believe, Stalin has acted only in self-defense and will go with Hitler not an inch farther than he has to, the division of Poland will give a maximum of disappointment to both sides.

Will Rumania be the next victim? A large part of her territory—Bessarabia—was taken from Russia by force. Other big segments came from Hungary and Bulgaria. For years, experts on the Balkans have expected Hungary to undertake by armed force the return of Transylvania, with German approval if not active participation. The assassination of Prime Minister Calinescu, bitter foe of the Rumanian Nazis, could easily have been the work of the Germans, trying to create a state of disorder that would serve as a pretext for armed intervention. In any case, if Germany or Russia or both of them should decide to invade Rumania, there is nothing to stand in their way.

There is talk now of a southeastern bloc of neutral states, to include Turkey, Rumania and Bulgaria, perhaps under Italian auspices; but everybody knows what such neutrality is worth; it is always on the side of the biggest battalions. There is also talk of an offer by Russia to guarantee Rumania and Turkey against an attack by Germany in exchange for an agreement not to let any belligerent use the Dardanelles. That would keep the French and the British out of the Black Sea and make Germany secure against any attack from the east (unless Stalin himself chose to attack her).

The situation in the Baltic has been about as obscure as that in the Balkans. The Estonian Foreign Minister conferred in Moscow on September 25 and then hurried home as reports circulated that the Russian Red Army was massing along the Estonian frontier. It was also reported that the Gulf of Finland, which gives access to Leningrad, was being closed by the Russians to foreign commerce. Tallinn, Estonia's port, would be a valuable addition to Russia, both in a commercial and a military sense. It is a sign of the times that speculation regarding Russia's intentions was not checked by the fact that she has treaties of peace and of non-aggression with Estonia, which also has a non-aggression pact with Germany and has her neutrality guaranteed by England and France.

The new partition of Poland and its repercussions throughout Eastern Europe show again Stalin's immense power. He can cast the deciding vote between Germany on the one side and France and Britain on the other. There is no evidence that he has cast that vote as yet, and in favor of Hitler. We do not know for certain what happened in Moscow during the negotiations with the British this summer, but we do know that their reluctance to enter an alliance was at least as great as that of the Russians, if not greater. By the timing of his non-aggression pact with Hitler, Stalin helped to precipitate a war which probably could not have been very much delayed in any case; but he did not guarantee victory to Hitler and he has not yet done so. He has removed or greatly diminished the threat of a German invasion of the Russian Ukraine. Thus far, events would seem to justify the statement made by Mme. Geneviève Tabouis in our pages several weeks ago, that by signing the non-aggression pact, Hitler made himself second man in Europe and Stalin first.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

Editors

BRUCE BLIVEN MALCOLM COWLEY R. M. LOVETT
GEORGE SOULE STARK YOUNG

Assistant Editors OTIS FERGUSON ELIZABETH HULING

Contributing Editors

JAMES BENÉT BRUCE BLIVEN JR. H. N. BRAILSFORD
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Westwall Enigma

THE MANY MILITARY EXPERTS HERE, of varying nationalities, show surprising agreement on fundamental problems of the Second World War. Some of their conclusions are herewith given.

Stalemate.—Two questions are asked most often by laymen. Why did the Allies not send military aid to Poland, at least in the form of airplane reinforcements? Alternatively, why did they not attack the Westwall, thus forcing Herr Hitler to withdraw troops from the Polish campaign? In briefest form, the answers of the experts are that the sending of an air armada to Poland, or an attack on the Westwall, would have entailed risks all out of proportion to the possible military gain. Their stupefying conclusion is that the Second World War has opened with a brilliant German victory in Poland, and, in the West, a vast stalemate.

The Westwall has central place in the experts' discussions. They show little interest in the layman's favorite question—whether, because of the haste in which it was built, the Westwall does not contain structural flaws. Even if it does, they say, it is necessarily several hundred times more formidable than the trenches of the First World War in 1914-18. Probably the Westwall can be breached, but almost certainly not without horrible losses of men and materials.

The experts show a most unmilitary emotional confusion—or so this layman ventures to think—about the Allies' future course. They half hope, half fear that there will be no major assault on the Westwall. To understand their reasoning, it is necessary to go back to 1914-18, and specifically to the great break-through of General Ludendorff in the spring before the war ended, to what are usually known as the battles of St. Quentin, the Lys, Chemin des Dames and the Marne. Upon this interconnected series of battles, all present-day military thinking seems to be based. At St. Quentin, the German armies smashed the Allied line on a forty-mile front, and drove through towards Paris for a maximum distance of thirty-eight miles. This is held to be the classic instance of the penetration of a fortified zone under the conditions of modern warfare.

What has changed since then? Three factors, say the experts: the fortified zones themselves, which are today immensely stronger; the mass use of tanks; and the mass use of aviation. The first, fortifications, and the last, airplanes, are important. Ironically enough, although the tank was specially invented for assault on fixed positions, it has been canceled out by the simultaneous development of the anti-tank gun. Its effectiveness in open warfare, demonstrated in Poland, is quite another problem. The experts say that the decisive value of aviation will be in reconnaissance. Surprise attacks, such as Ludendorff's at St. Quentin, will be immensely more difficult. In battle, opposing air forces will tend to offset each other, just as tank and anti-tank gun do.

Ludendorff broke the Allied line. His attack was brilliantly prepared and executed. For days only scanty, half-demoralized, retreating Allied contingents were between him and Paris, the Channel ports, victory in the First World War. Less than seven and a half months later, Ludendorff was in secret flight, and the German armies destroyed. What happened? The experts offer many reasons. The vast artillery preparation—more than 7,000 cannon on the German side alone—had torn the soil into a Doré drawing of hell, and made the bringing up of ammunition difficult. One expert here, who has made a special study of the battle, thinks that the turning point came when German troops encountered abandoned British stores, and saw with their own eyes that their leaders had lied to them about the starvation of England by submarines.

But all experts agree that the overriding reason for Ludendorff's inability to exploit his St. Quentin victory, and for the subsequent demoralization and surrender of Germany, was the German casualties. Regiments, even whole divisions, were destroyed, never to be reconstituted. After the 1918 spring offensive, the nerve of the German soldier was gone. The experts differ on the number of casualties that should be expected in a successful breach of the present-day Westwall; the commonest figure given is a million. But they are in quiet-voiced agreement that, after such an effort, England and France would never make another one. Soldiers are, of course, professionally conditioned to ignore the sentimental aspects of mass blood-letting. A break-through into Germany might be worth a million casualties, they say, if it meant speedy and complete victory. But, in the nature of the case, the Allied high command would be making one of the greatest gambles ever made by human beings. If the assault failed, at best there would be a negotiated peace, at worst a German triumph.

With these hints, readers have no doubt guessed what the experts believe the Allied strategy should be. It is to sit tight within their own Maginot Line, and let Herr Hitler gamble. He would lose, they think, quite as Ludendorff did. They believe that the threat to British supplies from German submarines will soon be ended, just as it was late in 1917. Britain and France can wait. Can Hitler? No expert—at least no one I found—would venture to say whether Hitler will be able to obtain supplies through neutral countries like Italy, or from the East, that is, from Hungary, Yugo-

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slavia, Rumania and, most important, the USSR. But they pointed out that Germany was entering the present war with known shortages of edible fats, oil, rubber, etc. They do not think Hitler can wait.

But having said so much, the experts betray the confusion mentioned above, one which illustrates, I think, the moral stress of a waiting policy. The military mind worships the initiative, "*toujours l'attaque.*" The same experts who say that the Allies should wait, a moment later burst out with: "If Gamelin sits sucking his thumb, he's licked." In the last few days, the questions of opposition members in Parliament show that a do-something-do-anything spirit is seizing English civilians: it is certain to increase. Here in the United States we have heard the inexcusably brutal comment of Senator Borah that the war is "phony" because young men are not thrown willy-nilly against machine guns mounted in concrete. I am bound to report, however, that experts here have great scorn for the present French tactics. In derision, one high-ranking officer pointed out that the Germans could undoubtedly build pill-boxes at least ten times as fast as the French are taking them. The Germans are under no necessity to counter-attack, he said, just let their labor battalions go on pouring more concrete.

"Wastage." – After the Westwall, the experts here are chiefly interested in air strategy. Their discussion bears directly on the current neutrality debate in Congress. It is probable, they say, that the Allies would in no case raid Berlin until the Germans had raided London and Paris. They want Germany to convict herself before neutral opinion. But where are the raids that, in all forecasts of another world war, were to be on mobilization points, on airplane and munition factories? The experts' answer centers around "wastage," a military euphemism for the fact that whenever warplanes leave their hangars, some of them do not return. General Goering has publicly put the expected wastage of German planes and aviators at 100 percent a month; the expectation of the American army is 30 percent a month.

The bald fact is, according to the experts, that the Allies cannot now risk wastage to the degree that the Germans can, and cannot, consequently, take the initiative in the air. At some point in the future—months ahead—the combined wealth and resources of England and France will doubtless enable them to reach and outstrip the production of Goering's factories. But today the Allies, with a second-best airplane industry, are in the position of Germany in 1914, with a second-best navy. As long as the 1914 German navy was intact, it was a threat immobilizing the British fleet. But had it been used, had Jutland been fought to a finish, and had the Germans lost, the war would have been over.

England and France, so the experts think, are in the fantastically horrible position of half-wishing that the Germans would bomb London and Paris, just as the Allied commanders are almost certainly hoping that Hitler will attack the Maginot Line. The experts have stirring tales of England's home defense, particularly of the trade-union crews that man anti-aircraft guns at each munitions factory. Whatever devastation a mass German raid might bring, the wastage of German planes would be extremely high. Experts here say that a change in our neutrality code to permit shipment of airplane replacements to the Allies is the single most important short-run factor in the European military situation. It is certain that this military opinion has been placed before President Roosevelt. Mysteriously the experts connect the presence in California of Captain Weidemann, Hitler's one-time commander, with the Allies' prospective dependence on the California aviation industry.

Polish Collapse. – Experts of all nationalities are warm in their praise of the German army's achievement in Poland. The German staff work, they said, appears to be better than anything the Germans showed in 1914-18. The Polish campaign has also discredited the stories about the inferiority of German motorized equipment that were current two years ago during the occupation of Austria. The swiftness of the German advance is laid partly to the destruction of Polish airports in the first few hours of hostilities. A warplane is a machine of extreme delicacy, with a high landing speed; once cut off from its "home," it is out of action. Experts predict it will be found that more Polish airplanes were lost by trying to land in cow pastures than in combat with the Germans. Poland's lack of airplane reconnaissance was fatal. As one expert said: "The Germans gouged out the eyes of the Polish army; it was like a blind man." Apart from the need of the Allies to conserve their air forces, the destruction of the Polish airports made it impossible for them to send air reinforcements eastward. The Germans were almost equally aided by their superior espionage. Each night, the experts believe, spies swarmed ahead of the momentarily halting columns. Because there was no fixed front, they presumably were able to infiltrate the Polish lines, and establish contact with other spies that the German army has had fixed in Poland for months, perhaps years. Among all experts I found deep contempt for Marshal Smigly-Rydz's desertion.

Things to Come. – Experts agree that, if a German attack on the Maginot Line does not come soon, the course of the war is likely to be determined by the European neutrals. Because of their fortified zones—which, puny beside the Maginot Line, are still formidable—they do not expect a German attack on Holland, Belgium or Switzerland. Nor do they expect the Allies to attack them, less because of the Allies' regard for international law than because of the fact the Germans

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are paralleling the frontiers of these three countries with their own fortified areas. On the assumption that Italy will maintain her neutrality for a lengthy period, they say that the likeliest new war area is Rumania. According to apparently reliable information, part of the British Expeditionary Force is being sent not to France but to Egypt and Palestine; one man with excellent connections in London says that the bulk is going there. Experts lay stress on the dispatch of General Weygand, last of the great French generals of 1914-18, to the Near East. Whether the Allied forces could give effective support to Rumania is an enormously complicated question. To summarize the experts' opinions, it depends on the attitude of the USSR, which in turn is believed to depend on the exact character of the German intentions towards Rumania. It is known that the English and American oil-company managers in Rumania, with two-thirds of the country's production under their control, are ready to dynamite their wells if the Germans advance, as was done in the 1914-18 war. During the twenties, one of the experts here was thrown into association with the German officer assigned by von Mackensen to bring the oil fields back into production. The officer said that no oil was ever obtained from British and American wells; those dynamited by the Rumanians were repaired in thirty days.

Washington T. R. B.

The War Aims of British Labor

No party in Great Britain has been more emphatic in its condemnation of Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy than the Labor Party. From 1931, indeed, it has consistently affirmed that the attitude of the National Government at some stage would necessarily result in the outbreak of a new world war. From Manchuria to Munich, it has emphasized the folly of consistent surrender to dictatorial aggression; and it has argued that each attempt at "appeasement" has only had the effect of stimulating the dictators' appetite for further conquest.

Looking back, I cannot see that there is anything in this criticism to retract. What has occurred is the inevitable outcome of Munich, on the one hand, and Mr. Chamberlain's crass folly in failing to build while there was time and opportunity that pact with the Soviet Union which he threw away by a combination of evasion and delay for which, on the Labor view, there can be no possible justification. His responsibility for the failure to maintain peace is, on any showing, a very heavy one. I do not question the sincerity of his desire for peace; I do say, in common with all my colleagues of the Labor Party, that each step he has taken to secure it was a long step on the road to war.

The time for an accounting on this issue has not yet come. Mr. Chamberlain's eyes have been opened, even if so tragically late. Given the circumstances, the Labor Party had no possible alternative but to support the decision to make war on Hitlerism. To have surrendered once more would, in its judgment, have been only to have strengthened the power of aggression not merely in Germany, but all over the world. It would have meant the need to face further Nazi demands six months from now, and under worse conditions. It would have still further enslaved the German people and those other victims of Hitlerite aggression. It would have made immensely more difficult the retention of faith in democratic institutions among ourselves.

Now, at least, there is a negligible minority only that does not realize the need to rediscover the dynamic of that faith. It is of supreme importance to the understanding of this conflict to realize that the years since 1933 have been a period in which the instinct of the common people of Great Britain has been continuously right, and, until the other day, the instinct of its ruling class continuously wrong. The common people has known from the outset that democracy could not accommodate itself to Nazi principles. The ruling class has taken six years to find out that they are incompatible even with those vested interests it believed itself to hold in common with the government of Germany.

The British Labor Party had therefore, as I say, no hesitation in saying that war, grim and dangerous though it be, was preferable to yet another surrender. I add that it was not moved one inch from that determination by the news of the German-Soviet pact. It would be folly to deny that it was shocked by its conclusion. Even while we understood how deep and how logical was the Soviet distrust of Mr. Chamberlain's good faith, we are still bound to take the view that the timing of the pact was the essential factor which made Hitler determine to gamble on war. Soviet neutrality may be justifiable upon evidence that Stalin and his colleagues have, so far, withheld from the socialist movements of the world. But the moment chosen for its declaration can, in our view, have had no other result than that of persuading Hitler that the most favorable moment for which he could hope had come. He was secure against a major war on two fronts; and he could count on supplies from the Soviet Union at least in part to counterbalance the effect of the British blockade. But the Soviet decision, grave though its implications necessarily are, did not for an instant affect the Labor attitude. It was felt all the more strongly that the abandonment of Poland, on the ground that her defense was made more difficult by Soviet neutrality, would

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only strengthen Hitler's conviction that there was no limit to the demands he could successfully make. Though the Labor Party, therefore, deeply regretted the Soviet decision, it at once communicated its view to Mr. Chamberlain that, in its judgment, that event did not affect the British obligation to stand by Poland against Nazi aggression.

As soon as war became inevitable, Mr. Chamberlain offered the Labor Party places in the National Government. That offer was at once, and unanimously, refused, and it is important to place on record the reasons for the refusal. In part, they are historical reasons. Labor has no confidence in the men who run the British government It has, ever since 1931, protested against their policy in the foreign and domestic fields. It could not surrender its right to criticize, if necessary, indeed, to attack, in return for a minority share in the determination of policy that would, obviously, profoundly limit that right. Like Mr. Chamberlain's government, it seeks the overthrow of Nazism; but it is not convinced that the ends it has in view in seeking that overthrow are Mr. Chamberlain's ends. It believes that the overthrow of Hitler is not an end in itself, but only the means to a wider and deeper end. It is not convinced that Mr. Chamberlain holds this attitude, or that he would support the means by which Labor seeks to attain it. At this stage, therefore, it was unanimously decided that the maintenance of the party's independence was pivotal to the future of the philosophy for which it stands.

Briefly, its attitude may be put in this way. The Labor Party is a socialist party. In its view the causes of war cannot be tackled at their root except in terms of socialist principles. The National Government is, in essence, an alliance of parties against those principles. For the Labor Party to enter the National Government would, therefore, have been the surrender of its fundamental convictions about the way in which Europe must be reconstructed after the war. It has no reason to suppose that these convictions would be adopted by Mr. Chamberlain. It would have lost the right to urge them on the electorate of Great Britain unless, while supporting the government to the full in the general aim of winning the war, it retained its right independently to insist that its own road to peace was the best road upon which to travel.

It is not easy to summarize in a short space what is involved in this outlook. But, shortly put, Labor starts from the premise that the basic flaw in the state-system of Europe (and, indeed, of the world) is the principle of national sovereignty. It is that principle which makes possible the use of war as an instrument of state policy. States cling to it because it enables them, at their own discretion, to use force as a means of imposing their will upon other states. They need it because they cannot otherwise protect the vested interests which determine the direction of their lives. In the modern state, the power to produce has outstripped the power to consume. To continue production upon the basis of the profit-making motive means, therefore, that states must find markets abroad for their surplus production which they cannot distribute profitably at home. This at once involves the whole complex of power-politics. It leads to imperialism. It postulates the necessity of heavy armaments. It involves that economic nationalism which has done such immense harm to the post-war world. Tariffs, subsidies, the hindrances to migration, the feverish search for spheres of influence, the fight for access to raw materials, are all involved in the nature of the modern economic system. It necessitates private war within, and international war without. It necessitates these, independently of the wills of those who are concerned in the governance of the system.

To get rid of war, we must get rid of the principle of national sovereignty. To get rid of national sovereignty, we must end that unequal society in which the instruments of production are privately owned and are operated only for the profit of those who own them. We need, therefore, a new social and international order as the condition of peace. Evil as Hitlerism is, in Labor's view, it is a symptom of the real disease; it is not the disease itself. No overthrow offers an opportunity for basic reconstruction. It no more, of itself, secures that reconstruction than did the victory over Germany in 1918. The restoration, accordingly, of capitalist democracy in Germany would still leave the vital causes of war unaffected.

What, therefore, is in the mind of the Labor Party is a move toward a wholly new orientation of Europe. It seeks for its federal and democratic reconstruction. It proposes a union of all European states on some such terms as the following:

1. The states which form the union must be prepared to pool their sovereignties, and to submit all disputes among themselves, without exception, to settlement by peaceful means.

2. They must agree to maintain the democratic form of government, and to guarantee, in accordance with that form, the essential liberties to their citizens without distinction of race, nation, color or religious creed.

3. They must agree to pool their defense forces for the purpose of mutual security.

4. They must agree to plan a collective economic life upon the basis of a customs union and joint economic arrangements in relation to currency, migration, labor standards and so on.

5. They must agree to arrange for the rapid transfer to national ownership of the vital instruments of production, with reasonable compensation to existing owners.

6. They must agree to internationalize, within the union, the ownership of colonies and to provide for their international administration; it being the primary objective of that administration (a) to safeguard native

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rights and (b) to develop colonies as rapidly as possible to the point where they may become self-governing democracies within the union.

7. To provide by way of loan for great national and international schemes of public works, to offset the dangers likely to be caused by the transition from a war to a peace economy.

8. To develop a common international policy in conjunction with such non-European powers as are prepared to accept these principles.

The Labor Party, of course, realizes that such a scheme cannot be brought into being immediately after the conclusion of hostilities. It is, therefore, beginning to envisage a peace made in two instalments. (1) As soon as the Hitler government is overthrown and a free German government exists prepared to move at once to the resumption of democratic life in Germany, hostilities can cease if that government is prepared to recognize the right of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to exist as independent states; the exact details of their boundaries would be settled at the peace conference. Austria would be given the right herself to decide whether she wished to remain part of Germany, or to resume existence as an independent state. At the peace conference, apart from this, there should be no annexations and no punitive indemnities.

But (2) the conference itself should undertake, as soon as ratification of its terms has been exchanged, to summon an international conference to create permanent machinery to which shall be entrusted the task of proceeding with the larger scheme of European reconstruction. It will, in effect, create a European society of democratic states which will form a federal union. They will proceed to implement the purposes of that union, as I have described them, as the internal circumstances of the member states permit; it being understood that, since they will have pooled their sovereignties, the rule of unanimity will no longer limit the power of the union to legislate for its constituent parts in the vital matters of common concern.

Save on the basis of such an approach the British Labor movement does not believe that it is now possible to deal with the fundamental causes of war. That is why it clings firmly to the idea of political independence. It will fully coöperate with the National Government in overthrowing Hitlerism; but it must be overthrown for socialist purposes and not for ends that would still leave the real causes of war unremedied. On this side, clearly, until the specific aims of the British government are known, the Labor Party must remain an opposition which purposes to become the government of the country at the earliest moment.

There is another reason for political independence. War means entrusting immense powers to the government of the day; it means the drastic curtailment of the normal civil liberties; and the powers conferred may be easily abused. It is essential to keep in being an Opposition that will watch narrowly the exercise of these powers and prevent their abuse. Such a scrutiny, close and rigorous and continuous, has the vital effect of keeping public opinion alive and free. It stimulates discussion among the electorate. It assumes that the nation does not forget, in the terrible drama of war, those permanent problems of a profit-making society which have to be watched with unremitting attention. The full protection of trade-union rights; the prevention of profiteering; the special problems of unemployment which a war creates; the equitable distribution of its cost in terms of taxation—these, to take examples only, require the vigilance of an opposition that is not handicapped by a partial responsibility for government policy which may proceed, at vital points, upon assumptions impossible for the Labor Party to accept. We do not take the risks of fighting Hitlerism abroad only to incur the erosion of democratic principles at home. And the best way for the Labor Party, as the effective guardian of those traditions, to seek their preservation is to remain out of office until it can have the predominant voice in the definition of policy.

One final word may be said. It was obviously the strategy of the Hitler government to achieve the rapid conquest of Poland, and then to offer peace to Great Britain and France upon the basis of their acceptance of that *fait accompli*. The British government firmly refused to accept that strategy in advance, and the Labor Party fully endorses its refusal. It would leave the Nazi government triumphant. It would leave unremedied not merely the basic causes of war; it would offer no assurance whatever that, in a brief space of time, the Nazi government would not apply similar methods to its next victim. After the experience of Nazism in the past six years, it has become impossible for any responsible statesman to accept its good faith. That is the primary lesson of Mr. Chamberlain's experience. Whatever his faults, from his angle he made a continuous and unremitting effort to discover terms of accommodation with Hitler. He found, as the Labor Party consistently warned him that he would find, that every offer was interpreted as a sign of weakness, that every "final" settlement was merely the beginning of new demands.

Too much has already been sacrificed on the altar of "appeasement." War is rooted in the very foundations of Nazism; its use of peace is merely as an interval of preparation for a real war. It is, therefore, the view of the Labor Party that there are no terms upon which peace can be made with the Hitler government. Once it has been overthrown, most desirably by the effort of the German people itself, new horizons open with new opportunities. The business of the Labor Party is to use all its strength to see that these are employed for socialist ends.

London HAROLD J. LASKI

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The End of the Reasoning Man

A Postscript to the Books That Changed Our Minds

NOW THAT this magazine has printed twelve articles on books that changed our minds, it is time to point out a few of their most significant findings. It is also time for self-criticism. In so far as the series has tried to deal not only with books but with ideas, and particularly with those germinal ideas that are affecting present-day Americans, it shows certain obvious limitations.

It is limited in time. By confining itself to the twentieth century, it leaves no place for the nineteenth-century books that continue to mold our thinking, not even for the two with the deepest influence on our own generation. Both "The Communist Manifesto," published in 1848, and "The Origin of Species," published in 1859, have given birth to a whole literature based on new conceptions of human life. Marx's historical materialism—the theory that "in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch"—has given a new direction to historians and political thinkers, including many of those who regard themselves as anti-Marxists. Darwin's idea of development from lower to higher forms, and of continuity between the natural world and the human world, has transformed not only biology but also the social sciences and even philosophy; it is the intellectual background of almost all the books revalued in the preceding articles. Yet neither Darwin nor Marx has been discussed, except indirectly.

Moreover, the series is limited in its contemporary subject matter. By confining itself to scholarly and speculative works, it leaves no place for works of the imagination. And people might say that even if plays and poems were omitted, novels should certainly be included in our list, on the ground that about five-sixths of American reading is fiction. To that criticism, there is a fairly simple answer. We are not concerned here with American reading habits, or with literature as such, but chiefly with the sources of our ideas. Not many of them originally came from novels, for the simple reason that it is not the novelist's job to supply them. If we had discussed books like "Ulysses" or "The Magic Mountain" or "Remembrance of Things Past" merely from the standpoint of what they contributed to contemporary thought, we should have been unfair to their authors as literary artists. That at least was the decision we reached. I might add, however, that the subject was argued back and forth, and that the novels we last thought of including were those of D. H. Lawrence—not because we considered them the most important as fiction, but because they are the best expression of an important tendency, the nostalgia for the primitive that has played a large part not only in contemporary letters but in contemporary life as well.

The series is also limited by the political temper of its editors and their advisers. Most of these are progressives in the sense that they believe in democratic control and in the possibility of social progress. The books that changed their minds are obviously not the disillusioned books that depict human beings as a herd of cowlike animals, fit only to be deluded by mock-heroic myths and preyed upon by an "élite" of "lions" or "foxes." I am quoting three words from Pareto's "Mind and Society," which was omitted from our list by almost universal consent. But Pareto is not the only author who represents that mood and tendency. By now the Italian and German fascists, who started with almost no philosophy at all, have adopted a long line of intellectual step-parents—for example, Count Arthur de Gobineau, with his "Essay on the Inequality of Races," and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who was Gobineau's apostle, and Richard Wagner, with his blond-beast heroes out of the Nibelungenlied, and Friedrich Nietzsche, with his pitiless supermen, and Georges Sorel, the French syndicalist who converted Mussolini to his belief in social myths and the beauties of violence, and Gaëtano Mosca, the Italian sociologist who outlined the theory of the élite that Pareto would develop in systematic detail. The house of fascist thought, as Max Lerner said, has become a death-house of all nations. Yet among the scores of fascist and pre-fascist thinkers, only Spengler is discussed in this series. A place might have been found for at least one other, and preferably for Hitler himself. By forcing us to defend the ideas that we once took for granted, he has affected us more deeply than many authors whose opinions agree with our own.

And "Mein Kampf" is not the only omission to be regretted. Among those books whose influence I have had a chance to observe, there are at least five others that might have been discussed at length. For example, there might have been an article on "The Golden Bough," a collection of strange beliefs and customs that ends by showing an essential similarity among primitive religions all over the world, as well as by explaining the origins of many Christian rites. It is apparently not well regarded by the present generation of American anthropologists—I note that the author,

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Sir James G. Frazer, is not even dignified with an article in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences—but it has most certainly affected us at second hand, through its influence on Continental philosophers and Anglo-American poets. . . . There might have been a chapter on "Middletown," by Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd. Dissatisfied with the purely statistical methods that sociologists had been following, they tried to achieve another sort of objectivity by studying a typical American community as an anthropologist might study a village in New Guinea. They were making "an experiment not only in method," as Clark Wissler said in his Foreword, "but in a new field, the social anthropology of modern life," and the field is being rapidly developed. . . . There might have been a chapter on Trotsky's "History of the Russian Revolution," a book that deeply affected many people who could not be called Trotskyites. The first of the three volumes, which is also the best, appeared in this country at the end of the Hoover administration, in those half-forgotten days when an American revolution seemed just around the corner. Thus, its effect partly depended on its timeliness. But partly it depended on a mystical fervor that led Trotsky to depict history as God and the revolution as the judgment of his God.

Our present list includes not a single book that deals with the nature of the physical world. The omission is explained, and I think partly justified, by the fact that modern men are more and more preoccupied with the social as opposed to the physical sciences. Yet there might have been a chapter on Whitehead's "Science and the Modern World," which examines the preconceptions of the great physicists and shows the need for a new philosophy (though not many of us are willing to accept, or even fully able to understand, the type of idealism that Whitehead advocates). . . . To represent the biological sciences, there might have been a chapter on Pavlov's "Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes," a book that shows the physical basis of what used to be called "instinctive reactions," and how they can be changed. It also suggests, by analogy, that most of our thinking is associational rather than logical. Among modern psychologists, only Freud has done as much to change our conception of the mind itself.

I do not think that any of the authors treated in this series should have been omitted. But instead of I. A. Richards' "Principles of Literary Criticism," we might have discussed "The Meaning of Meaning," the book that he wrote with C. K. Ogden. It helped to establish semantics as the new science of meaning or communication, and to persuade many students that it is "the essential preliminary of all the other sciences." . . . With these six additions and this one substitution, our study would be less incomplete. But of course no one series could do more than suggest the different facets of the modern mind.

Among the books discussed in the twelve essays, eight were written by Americans and four of these deal with American society. Perhaps this shows that our interests are turning toward ourselves. What a similar list would be if compiled by Englishmen or Frenchmen, or by Germans at home or in exile, I could not undertake to say. Probably most of the American books that we have treated would be dropped without argument. Quite possibly the only Americans represented would be two we have scarcely mentioned: Frederick Winslow Taylor (for his "Principles of Scientific Management") and William James. And not only would the authors be different, but also the mood and subject matter of the books included. American scholarly writing has shown a single-minded interest in amassing facts and an exaggerated distrust of theories (as compare Robert S. Lynd with Karl Mannheim, on sociology, or Franz Boas with Emile Durkheim, on primitive religions). Since Veblen died, we have not produced a social theorist of international standing, or an economic theorist to compare, let us say, with John Maynard Keynes. We have shown our talent rather in branches of learning that depend on practical knowledge of what happened and what happened next. To borrow and misuse two words from John Dewey and John B. Watson, we are instrumentalists and behaviorists. That is, we are interested in how and what rather than why—in seeing how things work and what people do rather than in final causes or ultimate goals. Moreover, we have a naturally democratic spirit that is more effectively expressed in the nature of our researches—which are likely to be concerned with ordinary people—than it is in our speeches about the glories of democracy. That our list shows both these tendencies I cannot regard as a fault or a limitation. It is part of our original plan, which was merely to discuss some books that have changed the American mind.

II.

But what do we mean when we say that our minds have changed? From what previous state have they changed, and in what direction? These are questions that cannot be objectively answered, there being no surveyors' instruments to measure the peaks and valleys of opinion. Still, we can make a rough topographical picture. By turning back to one of the nineteenth-century classics, we can use it as a fixed point from which to chart the course that our thinking has followed.

John Stuart Mill's great essay "On Liberty" was published in 1859, that is, in the same year as "The Origin of Species." Since then its influence has been felt in every country that had or hoped to have a middle-class constitutional government. Reading it today, one cannot fail to be impressed by a tone of high conviction that is seldom found in the writing of our

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own times. One cannot fail to admire the consistency and coherence of its arguments, or to accept its guiding principle, "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Indeed, this plea for individual freedom has such a power of persuasion that one cannot help wondering whether harm to others might not be prevented if the officials of every autocratic government were forced, against their wills, to learn whole chapters of the book by heart. At the same time, one feels that its background is pre-Marxian and pre-Darwinian. There is a curious simplicity, not so much in its arguments or conclusions, as in its unspoken assumptions about men in society.

Let me quote four typical passages:

1. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested.

2. On any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for every one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this preponderance—which there must be unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state—it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument.

3. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they have always done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few.

4. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner.

In these four passages there is a whole series of assumptions that have since been questioned. There is, first of all, the assumption that progress is the normal state of affairs, "that the tendency of things, on the whole, is toward improvement." In other books, and notably in "Representative Government," Mill insists that he does not regard progress as automatic and axiomatic. "We ought not to forget," he says, "that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs toward the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences and supinenesses of mankind; which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects." But having thus admitted the possibility of regression, he returns time and again to the idea of improvement, as if it were a law of the social universe. Indeed, for a man born in 1806, who had seen the world transformed during his own lifetime by an unparalleled series of inventions, who had watched the slow triumph of political reforms and social proprieties (with the Regency buck giving way to the philanthropic merchant), who had succeeded in his own profession while his class and country grew more powerful year by year, as a result, so it seemed, of their growth in knowledge and virtue—for such a man it was hard not to believe that the age of Victoria was immeasurably superior to the past, when the majority of eminent men "held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify." And it was hard not to believe that the same process of improvement would continue indefinitely, unless it happened to be checked by restrictions on freedom of thought and action.

But freedom of thought came first. For a second assumption was that progress depended wholly on the intellect, and resulted from the "preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct." There was of course a theoretical distinction between opinions and conduct, or wisdom and goodness, but in practice it could be disregarded, since the second almost always resulted from the first. Goodness was profitable, and men eventually did the profitable thing (after observing and discussing their mistakes, that is, correcting them by the normal processes of reason). While working toward their interests as individuals, they were also working toward the interests of society as a whole.

That leads to a third assumption, namely, that progress was due entirely to individuals. Society was not so much an organism as the arithmetical sum of its members. In the same way, the knowledge possessed by society was a sum obtained by adding together mil-

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lions of separate knowledges. That sum was being increased, as individuals discovered new truths and engaged in more diversified activities. Society as a whole was moving forward, but not as a result of collective efforts. Indeed, the collectivity had little to contribute: the best it could offer to individuals was security and freedom to continue their studies. A foolish society might prevent progress—as the Chinese had done—by requiring all men to think and act alike. But not even the wisest society could in itself achieve progress, which came about naturally through the work of "the gifted and instructed One or Few."

A fourth and last assumption concerned the nature of knowledge. Mill believed that those with sufficient aptitude might develop it by cultivating the virtues of humility and open-mindedness. The superior few, of whom he often spoke, were never instinctive or impulsive or intuitive; they never jumped to conclusions. Instead they went about improving themselves and others by looking at all sides of a case, by listening to all the arguments and comparing them, by rejecting the false and accepting the true—"No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any way but this."

To readers of our own time, it seems that Mill wrote his great essay on a false or at least an oversimplified notion of the mechanics of social change, of the part played in it by the intellect, of the relation between the individual and society, of the nature of knowledge and the methods by which it is normally acquired. It seems to us, moreover, that behind all his other assumptions lay the picture of an idealized creature that might be called the Reasoning Man. This was not the same as the Economic Man often mentioned in college courses, since all living persons are economic in the sense of being consumers, if not always producers, whereas Mill believed that only one out of a hundred was even comparatively rational. Yet this hundredth person was responsible for the whole of human knowledge and human progress. He was a creature outside of history as we know it; he had no acquired prejudices, no family or class or national loyalties; he was never ruled by animal instincts or sexual neuroses; he performed no reflexive or purely habitual actions. Except for his bondage to reason, he was free. Indeed, he was almost a god, almost the Unmoved Mover of medieval theology, since he contributed everything to society at large while receiving almost nothing in return.

The Reasoning Man was of course an abstraction, yet Mill seems to have believed that such a creature existed in the world about him. He believed, moreover, that this being, this entity, was strong enough to drive barbarism backwards, step by step, using no weapon but the pure force of its reason. He believed that he was himself a Reasoning Man and was writing for an audience composed of other Reasoning Men. He believed in his own impartiality and independence, never stopping to think that much of what he said revealed *unconscious* motivations (the word is of our own day), or was the result of previous *conditioning*, or represented the *attitudes* and *frame of reference* proper to his own *class* of highly trained administrators selected from the British bourgeoisie. In those days the bourgeoisie was triumphant, could see no end to its rule, so reason too was triumphant, and progress, always peaceful, stretched out into the future like the two safe rails of the trunk line from Manchester to London.

MALCOLM COWLEY

This is the first of two articles by Malcolm Cowley, concluding the series "Books That Changed Our Minds."—THE EDITORS

Rabble-Rouser of the Right

PROFESSOR WALTER B. PITKIN of Columbia University, with the encouragement of Cleveland business men, launched a new organization at Elyria, Ohio, in June. Mr. Pitkin has named it the American Majority, and he explains everything by saying that it is a "Movement for the Betterment of America." He refers to it also as a "League of the Middle Class in Revolt Against the Predatory Rich and the Predatory Poor."

Elyria was chosen as national headquarters and guinea pig of the movement because this city of 26,000 "so thoroughly typifies the solidity, energy and patriotism of American civil life." The fact that Elyria has no CIO, no liberal group and even fewer cultural influences than the average town of its size may also have been considered. Lorain County, of which Elyria is the seat, has frequently been described as the most solidly Republican county in the United States, and in the prosperous era Elyria claimed the largest per-capita wealth of any town in the country.

Mr. Pitkin represents himself to the town as "an average American—farmer, city-dweller, business man, educator, sociologist, champion of the rights of the everyday citizen." At a mass meeting on June 29 he said: "I would like to see the beginning of the training of a great army of idle youth to save the country. If a revolution comes it will be from idle youth." His two lieutenants, J. E. Neuger and A. L. Lewis, have recently gathered a number of Elyria's unemployed youth, coached them intensively in salesmanship intermixed with a robust Pitkinese philosophy, and sent them out among the townspeople as crusaders.

Membership dues are now payable to the American Majority at $100 for charter members, $3.65 for regular annual memberships, and $1 for all under twenty-five. It is rumored that large numbers of dollar memberships are being received, though Mr. Neuger refuses to make any statement. He has talked, however, of the "millions we expect to collect in Ohio alone"

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and explained that as soon as the pattern of procedure is evolved from experiences in Lorain County the organization is to be extended at once over Ohio and the nation. But just at present the position of the movement appears to be tenuous.

Observers conversant with Mr. Pitkin's lusty record as author of twenty-eight published books and innumerable shorter pieces consider him simply as a "super-salesman of literary handiwork" who puts on a good show. A vivid, picturesque figure, they concede, but not to be taken seriously as a potential leader of any great mass movement. "Only consider his feeble performance as a speaker when he held the mass meeting in June," they say.

Not all who heard that speech will agree that it failed to accomplish its purpose. Here are some of its phrases: "The kingdom of heaven is taken by violence"; "Get up on your hind legs and bark, and if you don't get results by barking—bite somebody"; "We who pay demand a say"; "To get fast action somebody must stir millions to genuine anger over conditions which are adversely affecting their lives"; "Nothing but hot news will serve; we need fewer Ph. D.'s and more red-hot reporters, less economics and more truthful muckraking; we need more thunder."

Mr. Pitkin has repeatedly warned industrialists that "if capital doesn't speak up it is going to be defeated." In an article published by Legislative News, Inc., September, 1928, he said: "I contend that American business men *must* learn human nature to the point of accepting as necessary the Rabble Rouser of the Right." Prior to this he was calling for "Words which smell, words which set fire to men and things, words which loosen avalanches back of the mountains. Polite patter can never save America. No elocutionists need apply. Heaven send us a Rabble Rouser of the Right."

If one considers Mr. Pitkin's qualifications to become himself this rabble-rouser, it is hard to dismiss activities in Elyria as of no consequence. Here is a man who is familiar with all the successful tactics of all the rabble-rousers, Left and Right, and realist enough to make use of any which seem expedient. This ex-peddler-cook-cattleboss-highjumper-junkman who has, through use of his wits, achieved both wealth and respectability without developing inconvenient sensibilities, might become a very useful tool for those who intend to preserve capitalism at whatever cost. His philosophy as set down in his books, his record of antagonism for the Newspaper Guild and labor organizations in general, and his condescending attitude toward democracy, to which he refers repeatedly as "primitive" democracy, leave no doubt as to where his sympathies lie and which blind spots are largest. Convinced that men are too stupid to govern themselves, he has demonstrated his willingness to serve as piper for big business men who have been humming for a long time the tune to which he has found the words.

MOTIER HARRIS FISHER

Other People's Money

Portrait of Mr. Big

THE REAL FIGHT of President Roosevelt now in this war crisis is to throw off the restraints of Congress and enjoy complete discretion in dealing with the situation produced by the war. If it is proposed to vest discretion in a single man over the peace and security of 130,000,000 people, it is proper to ask—what sort of man is this person who is to be given so great trust?

Happily, at the moment, an answer comes from one who saw him more intimately than any other human being in his first four years of power in the White House. Professor Raymond Moley has written a book—"After Seven Years" (Harpers)—describing his career as Roosevelt's confidential agent, adviser and speech writer. Hardly were Moley's chapters—which appeared first in The Saturday Evening Post—off the press when the faithful boys began to mutter bitter jibes about the man who kisses and tells. Pish tush! What is the law that restrains the minister from telling but hails the "memoirs" of the chief as legitimate scripture? All write their biographies and tell all, using freely the alibi and other devices to exculpate themselves and inculpate their superiors and subordinates. The generals—Foch and Haig and Pershing; the premiers—Clemenceau and Lloyd George—spoke freely of their colleagues. Thus are the threads of history spun. An inveterate New Dealer will resent what dims the luster of the Skipper's glory, but the public is entitled to know what sort of skipper is piloting the boat.

One need not concern oneself with the accuracy of all the details of the interpretations put upon events in all cases by the author. There is room for endless doubt about all this. Certainly it must be conceded that no man saw more of what went on in the sacristy than Moley; no one was better placed to be a competent witness. But what is important about this book is the character of Franklin D. Roosevelt that emerges from the total of all the incidents and episodes described.

There is the incident of the acceptance speech delivered at Chicago after Roosevelt flew to the convention to accept the nomination. Moley, after consultation with the candidate and his aides, had written the speech. But Louis Howe didn't like it. So Louis wrote another one. Louis got next to the President when he arrived in Chicago and was being taken to Convention Hall. Louis, who knew his chief well enough to feel that he knew what could be done with him, put his speech in Roosevelt's hands just as he came to the platform. That Howe could believe that Roosevelt would deliver a speech accepting the presidential nomination written for him without previously reading it is an amazing testimonial of what Howe, at least, thought of him. Roosevelt glanced hastily at Howe's draft. Then to please Louis, he read the first page of Howe's draft and the balance of Moley's speech.

It was necessary to have a tariff speech. Charlie Taussig was sent to Cordell Hull to have Hull write a tariff speech. Hull's speech was an old-fashioned free-trade oration.

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Moley *et al.* decided someone else should attempt another draft. Hugh Johnson wrote another one—a tariff-protection speech. Moley showed the two drafts to Roosevelt—two wholly divergent approaches to the tariff problem. Roosevelt read them, handed them back to Moley and said, "Weave them together."

Revealing is the account of the conference with Hoover about a renewal of the moratorium on European debts. There is no time to speak of the issues here. Roosevelt took Moley to the White House to that conference. Hoover had Ogden Mills. Moley had made a list of questions and points for Roosevelt to raise. Roosevelt had them on little cards—one to a card—tucked in his pocket. Hoover talked for an hour and a half. Moley, who plainly disliked Hoover, said Hoover's mastery of the debt-problem data was amazing. When Hoover finished, Roosevelt slipped his little cards unobtrusively from his pocket and used them as his cues, glancing for help occasionally to his mentor.

February, 1933, was slipping away. Roosevelt and Moley were at the Gridiron dinner. Roosevelt was in the gayest of moods, laughing, wisecracking with all. He pushed a little note under the table to Moley. Moley read it. It was in Hoover's handwriting. The banks were crumbling. Everything was falling apart. It was indeed a dark hour. Hoover wanted a conference. But there sat Roosevelt throughout the evening, happy, unruffled, buoyant, gay. Then followed the terrible days preceding the inauguration and the final collapse. Throughout, Moley, Woodin, Awalt, Mills, Robey, Berle worked night and day struggling for a plan to meet the rapidly developing banking disaster. Through it all Roosevelt remained joyous, merry, completely undisturbed, speaking in the same happy spirit with Woodin and Moley about the bank crisis and with Admiral Grayson about the inaugural parade.

Moley tells in detail the inside history of the economic conference which Roosevelt ended with his famous "bombshell" message. Hull was sent to London completely deceived as to his powers and objectives. Moley was sent to check Hull. The American delegation was torn by misunderstandings. Hull complained of the humiliations he was subjected to. Frantic efforts were made to reach Roosevelt. The Skipper was lost in the fog aboard the "Indianapolis" on one of his many sea excursions. Then he sent his amazing message which ruined the conference, and lectured its delegates. Moley was now subjected to the same sort of obfuscation as Hull. Moley returned after the humiliating fiasco. He walked into the President's bedroom. Not a word about being sorry that Hull had been so badly treated or that Moley had been put in so difficult a position. Only a gay "Hello! You missed the papers while you were away. My message really got a grand press."

In December, 1935, as Congress was about to meet, he summoned Moley and said he wanted a fighting speech. Whom are you going to fight? asked Moley. Roosevelt smiled. He wanted to keep his left-wing supporters satisfied. Thus the happy saga unfolds. There is much more. But no man can presume to have an intelligent opinion about the events of these eventful years without reading this very sprightly narrative by its chief witness. But, one asks, is this the man into whose hands the fate for peace or war of 130,000,000 people is to be committed?

JOHN T. FLYNN

Odets: II and Et Cetera

To continue with the Clifford Odets plays, the ending in this form of art is more the thing than in fiction. Not just because of any rule, or any trick, but because an end is something anticipated from the beginning, the final reason for the whole. It is both an emotional and logical release. Odets had such an easy time solving the insoluble by just saying Workers Arise! that he seems still to jump into the middle of something and trust to God almighty to get him out. I mentioned "Paradise Lost," where the end was fat with poetics and exhortation, but arose too obviously from the pure need to have these things—prophecy instead of fulfilment, not anchored in what had gone before or what could be found in the world it was drawn from.

"Golden Boy" was a more theatrical play than any of the others, and it had scenes in it that were terrific in the theatre—and the end was dramatically right for it. Some complain that a ring champ wouldn't play a violin (or gloss Shakespeare either, I suppose?); some complain of melodrama—an epithet used most often to hide some incapacity to explain just what was wrong dramatically. And some have said that since Odets' characters always talk Jewish, they shouldn't be made Italian—which is correct but a minor point. I say only that it was a good theatre evening, and that the motion picture made from it is a good motion picture. The close-up technique shows some of Odets' tendencies to blah more clearly, but it gains in the really moving work of Lee J. Cobb as the father. With a few amusing modifications, it sticks so closely to the original as to be more burdened with dialogue than a film should be. Its pictorial coverage of the fight is the thumping best study of a fight *and* a fight audience ever made. Thanks to the play and a sterling cast (Joseph Calleia's Fuseli did not strike the odd terror of Elia Kazan), it is an exciting and well projected picture.

But thanks to the picture and its different, or "happy," ending, we can see that the play wavered so much, from inside, that either ending was possible. The emphasis throughout was on a split personality. Owing to circumstances the conflict was a lively thing, at least in theatre surface; but the true dramatic development was canceled out in a tug-of-war between right hand and left. "Hamlet" had somewhat the same problem, and "melodrama" to sustain it; but "Hamlet" went deeper and spoke more widely, more for the running and less for the show.

I still believe Odets' place is in the home, in his prototypes of the mute millions all over the place today, in his appreciation of and true compassion for people in the bewilderment of living—both making one and making something out of it. He likes "Paradise Lost," with its superimposition of current psalmistry. I like "Rocket to the Moon," in spite of its rather hasty resolution. This is as tight a piece of dramatic joining as you will find, marvelous in the ingenuity with which the play moves forward by the use of three men, two women, two commentators, one dentist's office. It is not only that this ease in the form means release from formalities as such. In this story of likely people trying to find their way out of the likeliest of difficulties (likely but not humdrum, it must be empha-

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sized) the freedom from strain gives it the complete scope of honesty in dealing with the problems of people who have somehow to live and who dream of living happily.

I don't know whether, as this last play suggests, the catchphrase and the overwriting will finally come out in the wash. But I do know that as far as living drama is concerned, Clifford Odets already holds a corner on the genius of serious writing for the theatre today.

Picture-Motion Note. – "The Real Glory" is almost a pure adventure film, and reminds us how this type is dwindling in the movies of recent years. There is a girl who gets somewhat in the way of it, but mainly it goes on with the hair-raising troubles of the U. S. Army in mopping up the Philippines after we took them over. In order to put down the marauding Moros, they had to train a Filipino army; and though Gary Cooper, David Niven and Reginald Owen were there on the spot, this was so difficult that the whole thing almost ended in complete annihilation by cholera. What with boar-traps, bolos, a near-blind commander and the sea and jungle, interest clips right along through the film (Henry Hathaway's direction); but the big thing is the all-in fight at the end, as bloody, complex and explosive an action as has been made (Sam Goldwyn's production). There is a tendency to type the human-interest elements which stiffens up some parts; but adventure on any kind of sound basis is always good stuff in the films. "The Women" and "The Old Maid," for example, were more serious and searching in a small way, and elegantly produced; but the releasing effect of motion, which is part of the camera's gift to art, is constipated in them and is thus a less happy thing to sit through.

Own-Words-for-Breakfast Department. – When I said recently of Darryl Zanuck's "Stanley and Livingstone" that it was so good a picture possibly because Mr. Zanuck had his back turned while his assistant Kenneth Macgowan did the work, both Mr. Macgowan and Philip Dunne of the Zanuck studio came down on me, though with kind words. They said in effect that whatever Zanuck's faults, he didn't have his back turned on a production even when he was asleep; and that my hypothetical crack was therefore ill advised. They were quite right—though I did have the excuse of having walked out on at least twenty Darryl Zanuck specials. There ought to be run as a banner over every film review: the characters (especially writers, cameramen, cutters, directors) appearing in this review are wholly fictitious and not to be confused with any living persons—the best piece of "direction" in the picture might have been suggested by a grip.

I like the idea of the Hollywood boys getting interested enough to pull the critics up short. They do too little of it. I suppose a few years of reading "stunning photography" where it was the location that was stunning, "expert direction" where the writing was foolproof, over and over, makes them feel, What's the use? As Philip Dunne says, "it is almost impossible to tell where one man's contribution stops and another's begins. A reviewer for a trade paper once wrote that 'Donald Ogden Stewart's additional dialogue was sparkling.' You gather that he was able to distinguish between the additional and the ordinary dialogue." And in this particular instance, Kenneth Macgowan points out that Zanuck "happens to have spent more time on the African continent than any except North America, and to have developed an enthusiasm for its life and history which might be compared to the enthusiasm once shown by Stanley and Livingstone." Which shows how far wrong you can be without half trying. My regrets to Mr. Zanuck.

It is another nice thing to know, in regard to the Wiere Brothers I have been blowing a horn for since Kurt Robitschek brought them from London last year, that they were on several vaudeville wheels in this country years ago and in at least three pictures. John Hans Winge of Birmingham, Alabama, writes about my discovery: "I saw the three boys the first time in 1930 in Berlin in a stage-show. They had a striking success and were later booked by Mr. Robitschek, who at that time was the owner of the largest Berlin vaudeville theatre." The only one of their American films he can remember was "Wonder Bar." "They returned to England, but not to their home city of Berlin." Wherever they are, they're all right. OTIS FERGUSON

The Bandwagon

The morning papers carry stories that actual fighting has begun in Europe. If it is true it is a sad fact. One thing, however, is that war is not caused by magicians, for they are a peaceful group. As individuals, magicians of all countries are kindly, friendly people. War puts magicians out of business and does no one of them any good. – *From The Sphinx (A Magazine for Conjurors), September, 1939.*

It is with great sorrow that we announce the death of our partner, Mr. George B. Dabney, on the seventh of September, 1939. Out of respect for his memory our offices will be closed today between the hours of ten and twelve except for the transaction of routine business.—F. L. Dabney & Co. – *A notice in The Boston Herald.*

War-Is-Hellish Department

Mr. and Mrs. William C. Breed obtained a fairly good cabin-class stateroom, but their maid had to sleep on a cot in the corridor outside their door with sheets hung from the ceiling to give her a modicum of privacy. – *News story in The New York Post.*

There has been some grumbling [from] one gentleman who for twenty-five years had taken his breakfast in bed, and from another who, eating in one of three shifts using the dining-room, found he must strip foil covering from his cheese. – *The arrival of the U.S.S. "Washington" as reported in The New York World-Telegram.*

Produced by Billy Rose

Mayor Sewell announced that Miami, not to be outdone by European cities, will have an air raid, with its accompanying blackout, this winter. – *News item in The Chicago Daily Tribune.*

You Can't Cheat an Honest Man

Recently there was published a telegram I sent to Father

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Coughlin. This peace pact, I said, "proves conclusively that the Bolshevik government of Russia is out-and-out Jewish. Henceforth let no man dare to say that you don't know what you are talking about."

To this there came from Royal Oak, Michigan, the following reply:

"Just a note in brief acknowledgment of your wire of August 23. A thousand thanks for your expression of encouragement and reassurance. Sincerely, Charles E. Coughlin." – *From a letter by Louis Joffe printed in The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.*

Happy Days Are Here Again

Invasion of Poland by Russia was warmly approved today by Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in the United States, and acclaimed as "another triumph for human freedom" by The Daily Worker, Communist Party newspaper. – *From The New York World-Telegram.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column and $1 will be paid for each item used. Address The Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

A Communication

On Leaving the Communist Party

SIR: I joined the Communist Party, after long hesitation, because I believed in its aims and because it seemed to offer the best way of working for those aims. As a party member, participating in its work on many levels, I became more and more convinced of its effectiveness. I am now resigning from the party because it is no longer an organization in which I can be effective.

The occasion of my resignation is the Soviet-German pact, but that does not mean that I am prepared to condemn the pact and its consequences. I see the validity of some of the arguments put forth in its defense. Furthermore, the record of the Soviet Union compels me to suspend judgment. It is possible that history will prove the soundness and wisdom of the Soviet leaders. I am still ready to give them the benefit of the doubt. The truth is that I do not know what is happening in Europe, and until I have far more information than I have now I cannot come to any conclusion about Soviet foreign policy.

That is my immediate quarrel with the Communist Party of the United States. If the party had left any room for doubt, I could go along with it, at least for the present. But defense of the pact is now an integral part of the line and, indeed, has inevitably become the most important item of political belief. Leaders of the party have generously urged me to take all the time I wanted to make up my mind. They have sympathized with the difficulty of my decision, and have not made the slightest effort to force my adherence to the party position. But they have made it clear that, if I eventually found it impossible to defend the pact, and defend it in their terms, there was nothing for me to do but resign.

In common with many of my friends, I have been much more disturbed by what has happened in the American party in the past month than by what has happened in the Soviet Union. I cannot now defend the pact, but I can conceive of history's justifying it. I can see no justification for the behavior of the party.

The party is now telling us that the pact was a necessary and wise move. If that is true, the leaders of the party should have prepared the American people for such a possibility. They tell us now that Stalin's speech last March to the eighteenth congress of the CPSU foreshadowed this development. This is wisdom after the event. No party leader, prior to August 21, had ever drawn such conclusions from the speech. On the contrary, when journalists predicted such a pact, they were indignantly denounced. I am not saying that advance notice should have been given to the world by the Soviets; I am saying that an analysis which ruled out the possibility of a pact was false.

Moreover, so far as one can judge from all the evidence, the leaders themselves were completely unprepared for what has happened. They were unprepared for it, and they did not understand it. If they had only said this, if they had only admitted their ignorance, the Communist Party of the United States would be intact today. But instead they insisted that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was the greatest possible contribution to peace and democracy, and offered anything that came into their heads as proof. They rushed into print with apologetics completely devoid of clarity and logic. Only one conclusion could be drawn: if the party leaders could not defend the Soviet Union intelligently, they would defend it stupidly.

If anyone had any illusions about Moscow gold, which I may say for the sake of the record I never saw the slightest evidence of, these recent weeks should have destroyed them. Nothing could be clearer than the fact that Communists in this country had not been given the slightest inkling of what was to happen. If the leaders had frankly admitted this, if they had simply pointed to the record of the Soviet Union and asked people to wait and see, they would have strengthened the party. But they insisted on giving the impression that they were under orders from Moscow, without having the authority that a close tie with the Soviets would have given them.

The leaders of the Communist Party have tried to appear omniscient, and they have succeeded in being ridiculous. They have clutched at straws, juggled sophistries, shut their eyes to facts. Their predictions have almost uniformly been proved wrong within twenty-four hours. They have shown that they are strong in faith—which the future may or may not justify—and weak in intelligence.

One thing that particularly concerns me is the fact that, as the party has retreated from one untenable position after another, it has revealed the likelihood that its domestic policy may be drastically altered. Though I have been a warm supporter of the democratic front, I have not been

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uncritical of the way in which the democratic-front line has been applied, and I have been willing to listen to more fundamental objections. If the American situation had greatly altered, I could conceive of adopting a different position. But I cannot accept a change that is dictated by the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy. It still seems to me essential to aid the Soviet Union, but I believe that can be done, not through stupid, unconvincing apologetics, but through the building of a stanch bulwark against reaction in America.

How much strength and influence the Communist Party has lost remains to be seen, but it is my belief that the events of these past weeks have in large measure destroyed its effectiveness. I think the party did a magnificent job in building the united front. I have seen for myself that the most intelligent leaders and the hardest workers in trade unions and in every type of progressive organization were Communists. The present policy of the party is going to make such work vastly difficult, perhaps impossible. Even if the party does not abandon the policy of the democratic front, as it may, its members will be unable to build that front. When the party reverses itself overnight, and offers nothing but nonsense in explanation, who is likely to be influenced by a Communist's recommendations?

I can understand those who have been made bitter by a sense of betrayal, but I feel no impulse to denounce the Soviet Union. After all, the Soviet Union is a socialist commonwealth, and, even if it makes mistakes, its fate is of the utmost concern to every believer in socialism. I shall continue to defend its achievements, and I think my defense may be all the more effective because I am not committed to the proposition that every detail of Soviet foreign policy is necessarily and demonstrably wise and beneficent.

Furthermore, I propose to do my best to defend the Communist Party. Nothing distresses me more about leaving the party than the realization that I am leaving it at a moment when it is in extreme peril. I know as well as any party member that the pact is not the cause of the present drive against the party, and I know too that no progressive movement is safe if the party is suppressed. The whole progressive cause has suffered, and we must repair the damage as rapidly as possible. Defense of the full legal rights of the Communist Party must be an important part of the redoubled fight against reaction.

Leaving the party is as serious and difficult a step as joining it. I value my years in the party not only for the experience and the associations, but also for the opportunity they gave me of fruitful work for a cause I believed in. My problem now is how to continue that work.

Grafton, N. Y. GRANVILLE HICKS

Correspondence

Loss-Leader

SIR: The reprint in your issue of September 20 of the excellent editorial, "Force and Ideas," from the first issue of The New Republic shows that if the political situation was no better in 1914 than it is in 1939, at least editorial writing was.

Washington, D. C. D. L. HARLEY

Fighting Words for Peace

SIR: Your article, "America's Role in War" [September 6] seems a most inauspicious beginning for The New Republic's role in war. In the first place, just what America are you talking about? Whose America, yours, mine, the America of the ordinary young people who are going to be asked to do the dying, or the America of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stettinius? As far as the ordinary people are concerned, the cost of war is "paid on both sides" with a merciless lack of favoritism.

Possibly you envisage [at the end of this war] a liberal semi-socialist Germany under the presidency of, say, Thomas Mann. After all, the Weimar Republic emerged from the last war, and beneath its surface of muddleheaded humanism the struggle of German imperialism to reassert itself never ceased for an instant. Do you really believe that this is an ideological war, that the only content of history is the wishful thinking found in leaders in liberal weeklies?

Your remark "We are perfectly safe behind the Atlantic against any navy in the world except the British, and that, we believed, would never be used against us. But suppose, by a British defeat, Hitler suddenly became master of it?" Are you really so foolish? Do you really believe that warring nations are cowboys in the movies? Do you really believe that Hitler could lift the British navy intact from its present possessors, like a pistol from a holster, and point it at us? Is or is not British imperialism the final competitor of Yankee imperialism? Is or is not the struggle between them the "final conflict" of world capitalism? What did you read all those books for, relaxation?

The Neutrality Act now embargoes all arms, ammunitions and implements of war. "Cash-and-carry" control of other commodities is partially taken care of by the Johnson Act. That seems to have slipped your mind during this troubled period. Our only salvation is to stick to our guns. It is going to be a stiff enough fight as it is. More stringent guarantees of neutrality must be fought for in new bills. Any attack upon the present Neutrality Act will be used by the administration.

As for the danger that England and France will run out of the implements of war without our aid, how about Germany? What combination of industrial plants in the world is going to be able to replace the present mountain of armaments promptly on the first of every month? After all, tanks with a speed of eighty miles an hour are not something a couple of boys can build in the garage on Saturday afternoons. However efficient the German industrial plant, it is bound to give out first. *The only way this war can be stopped is by starving it to death.*

The present set-up in our neutrality legislation permits the English and French people to buy enough to eat from us on a cash-and-carry basis, it strictly limits the time during which the imperialists on both sides can go on killing the working class. If, further, the administration can be forced to abandon the Import-Export Bank, the war will be forced to a stalemate with a slight advantage on the side of the Allies in a very short time. This means a drawn peace and the fall of Hitler. Is this what you want? Or do you want a long, bloody war, "Pulaski, Here We Come!" a new Versailles, a new Weimar Republic, and a hundred new Hitlers?

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The New Republic has spent twenty years trying to forget its role in the last war. You have taken the first step toward Dollar-a-Year jobs for your staff—you had better reconsider before it is too late.

San Francisco, Calif. KENNETH REXROTH

[Since our readers would hardly infer the contents of the editorial from Mr. Rexroth's letter, it is well to repeat that its main argument was for strengthening the neutrality legislation so that we should not be drawn into war, in spite of the increased pressures to do so which arise from the existing situation. As a means of doing so, we urgently recommended enactment of a cash-and-carry amendment. Contrary to Mr. Rexroth's impression, this principle is not now in effect. American ships at this moment are carrying contraband through war zones.

The main difference between Mr. Rexroth and ourselves seems to concern whether munitions shall be completely embargoed, as at present, or placed under the cash-and-carry provision. We believe this question is unimportant relative to the main one of preventing incidents to our shipping. Nevertheless it seemed to us that if a situation should arise—as it might—when lack of ability to buy airplanes or other necessary munitions here created imminent danger of British and French defeat by Hitler, the pressure for entering the war might become too strong to be resisted. Let's keep our heads cool about this business and not let our reason run off into slogans. – THE EDITORS.]

Help Wanted!

SIR: The South with its millions of underprivileged and highly exploited tenants, sharecroppers and farm day laborers, white and Negro, engaged in growing cotton, has but one champion of democracy—the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. For more than five years this union has fought valiantly for better conditions. We are still fighting on every line.

The people who make up the STFU are so poor that only a very few of them are able to pay dues. We therefore must depend on contributions from those who are interested in helping to solve "the nation's number-one economic problem." Please know that contributions will be highly appreciated and very helpful in the struggle of building an organization to end peonage in the South.

J. R. BUTLER
President, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union
Memphis, Tenn.

Two Warnings

SIR: A warning. The heat is on. The torchies this time as always are the industrialists who are determined that the United States get in there. Don't underestimate their power when they really want to turn it on.

As in every war there are heroes and villains. The general idea of the war-makers is to create sympathy for the heroes. This time their task is relatively simple. But sympathies are not enough. Sympathies are a necessary beginning, but they do not make profits. Profits can only be realized out of an active war trade with the belligerents, and that is the prelude to our participation. Already they are clamoring for the repeal of the Neutrality Act, trying to high-pressure Congress by all means known to propagandists.

Another don't. Don't be lulled to complacency by the apparent vociferous outcry of the press that "we will never again send our boys overseas to battle on foreign soil." The ones to watch are those who make the most noise. These gentry did a somersault in 1917 and they are out to do a repeat performance.

Seattle, Wash. RAYMOND DOCTER

SIR: Now that the British White Paper has appeared, it seems to me a matter of urgent necessity that you write Chamberlain's Black Paper, and as forcibly as possible, while the process of beating absolute, blind hatred of Hitler into the minds of Americans is still in a comparatively early stage. Villains are unfortunately necessary in such conflicts, and it would be a fatal mistake if the American people should be presented with only one of them, as in the last World War.

One very good reference is Schuman's "Toward the New Munich" in your May 31 issue.

E. Sumner, Me. WILLIAM ROBINSON

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Vera Eastland, of Richland Center, Wisconsin, confesses that like a dope she had taken her information from The New Republic until she heard a Hugh Gibson broadcast on Spain. "There is no fascism in Spain; the Church couldn't have exploited peasant labor on its lands because it had no lands; the only areas that were bombed were ports," etc. She is right in wondering where we have been all this time. We didn't have more than two staff members and half a dozen contributors in Spain during the war. Our people are simply wondering where Ambassador Hugh Gibson was all that time. . . . Mrs. Ruth Crawford says right out (speaking from Colorado Springs, Colorado) that she doesn't doubt Gibson's integrity but can't believe half he said. Was he, she asks, sold the Brooklyn-to-Europe bridge in the way Lord Bryce was made to think he saw baby's hands and raped mothers in Belgium during what we used to call the World War? We should not underestimate the number of things that can be done with mirrors.

M. W. Woolsey—a Lakeland, Florida, broker—finds it obvious in our editorial about the railroads (August 30) that there is plenty we don't know about the railroads. He says that among other things government valuations should have told us that too much old talk about watered stock had passed over the dam. He says we haven't noticed the lack of "labor disorders and evil practices." He shouldn't say that to us: one of our editors is an honorary member of the Brotherhood of Pullman Porters.

The Second-Class Mailbox. – We like the circular sent around by the American Committee for Anti-Nazi Literature, in which they call the attention of amateur photographers to a series of "picture stories" in Look. For every picture showing the Nazi Bund in action that Look selects, it will pay $10. You couldn't do the average Bundsman a dirtier trick than publishing his picture. . . . Babson's Reports tell us that "the cost is only $3" for an "investor's envelope" they are preparing. The envelope will enclose fourteen very special features, of which the first—to whet your appetite—is "*Future Leaders*: Six selected WAR STOCKS still in a buying range." If you've got a buying range, better string along with Babson, who guarantees to take all the war out of profit. . . . The Book and Magazine Guild, 239 Fourth Avenue, New York City, is expanding its courses on book production, promotion, etc. (the fall term begins October 23). Non-Guild members can take advantage of this fine chance for vocational training at $7.50 per course.

The Third-Class Mailbox. – Joe Gould, who is growing a beard again, brought into the office a follow-up on his poem ("Communism Is Twentieth Century Americanism") in which Earl Browder was found to have switched from borscht to clam chowder:

Now Comrade Browder
Likes Wienerworscht
Both in his chowder
And in his borscht.

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The Nonesuch Dickens

THE NEW EDITION[1] of the works of Dickens brought out by the Nonesuch Press is the most complete yet published and therefore the most important. Too expensive for the ordinary public, it will nevertheless have to be bought by every library meant for research. Aside from this, the Nonesuch edition is in some ways disappointing: it suffers from the ineptitude and the amiable superficiality which have in general been characteristic of the race of Dickens scholars, biographers and critics.

That the volumes are too large and heavy to handle—one of the thickest would amount to an extra piece of luggage almost as big as a night-bag, if one took it along to read on a journey—is not to be blamed on this particular edition. This seems to be an inescapable feature of all definitive collected editions. The tradition of the Renaissance folio is still strong in modern book-making, and any publisher bent on serious achievement still feels under the necessity of producing something monumental—something which it is an affliction to read in bed or on the train and which, in order to be made really practicable, would require a book-holder or a lectern. Of course, these sets are made partly for display in what used to be called a "gentleman's library." But the general reading public today do not have so much room for books; and many people would find it almost as difficult to accommodate the new set of Dickens (even if it were within their means) in the small houses and apartments they live in as to make room for a grand piano. The real needs of the modern public are reflected in the recent appearance of the excellent editions of authors in one volume—Blake, Donne, etc.—published by Random House, and by the French Pléiade editions of French authors published complete in two or three volumes. The Nonesuch edition of Dickens belongs to the age of the dinosaurs.

Other features of the edition, however, must be charged to the caprice of the editors, who, as Dickens is rarely admitted to be quite a serious writer, seem to share the general lack of seriousness of the people—with the notable exception of George Gissing—in whose hands Dickens has been left. They have, for example, had the happy idea of binding each work in a different color, so that the set, on the library shelf, has the appearance of a badly arranged spectrum. And it has furthermore seemed to them helpful to make each novel complete in one volume, with the result that "Our Mutual Friend" looks as enormous as a pharmacopeia, while "A Tale of Two Cities," beside it, has the appearance of a rare pamphlet in binding. Since this principle has not been carried out in regard to Dickens' works of non-fiction and the collections of his shorter stories, which have in the normal way been lumped together to make volumes of normal size, the whole effect is rather pointless and messy.

A good feature is the inclusion of all the illustrations that appeared in the original editions of both the volumes and the monthly parts—the illustrations to the Christmas books have been hand-tinted as in the original Christmas editions. So far as I know, none of the other collected editions has been complete in this respect. It would seem also to have been a good idea to reproduce these illustrations, as has been done, from the original plates, when available; but the results are not always good, because the old plates are sometimes worn and faint. The somber pictures in "Bleak House," for example, with their densities of fog and darkness, have here lost a good deal of their effect. A good printing from new electroplates would have been better. (One of these original plates in a case is included with every set.) The printing of the text is quite beautiful: the type very plain and well spaced.

The worst feature of the set as a whole—except in the case of the volumes of letters—is the lack of editorial commentary and documentation to supplement the text. The pictures have been assembled; some misprints have been corrected; but this is nearly all that has been done by Messrs. Waugh, Walpole, Dexter and Hatton. Is it impossible to recover the original ending which Dickens wrote for "Great Expectations" before he was persuaded by Bulwer Lytton to let the Boy get the Girl? If it is, the editor should at least explain that such an ending once existed. In the case of "Edwin Drood," the omissions are inexcusable. It was found by W. Robertson Nicoll that John Forster, in preparing for publication the last instalments left by Dickens, had disregarded extensive corrections which Dickens had made in his proofs; and these corrections, together with the evidence of passages which Dickens rewrote in the manuscript, corroborate pretty conclusively the theory that Datchery, the mysterious character who appears in Chapter XVIII, was Helena Landless in disguise. Yet the editors of the Nonesuch edition have dismissed these revisions as of no significance—of interest, as they remark, only to scholars. They should certainly have included the variants—both from the proofs and from the manuscript. Nicoll did not print all of the latter, but only such as seemed to throw light on this particular problem. There may be also passages that would clinch the other conjectures—advanced since Nicoll's book—which seem as certain as Walters' conjecture about Datchery: Mr. Howard Duffield's demonstration that John Jasper must have been a member of the secret cult of Indian stranglers called Thugs, and the discovery by Professor Aubrey Boyd of the University of Washington that the influence exerted by Jasper on the other characters had all the symptoms of malicious animal magnetism as conceived and described by Mesmer. The main documents on "Drood" should have been given, and some notice of these important theories.

The most valuable feature of the set is the new collection of Dickens' letters edited by Mr. Walter Dexter. These three volumes contain all the letters that are available at the present time. The principal omission is the series written by Dickens to his wife, which are now in the British Museum and are not for some years yet to be released for publication. These letters give a more complete picture of Dickens' private life than it has ever been possible to get before. We see him evolve from the middle-class boy, who invites his friends to partake of "the rosy" in accents not unlike those of Dick Swiveller, and who suffers agonies of wounded pride over his rejection by Maria Beadwell,

[1] The Nonesuch Dickens, published under the editorial direction of Arthur Waugh, Hugh Walpole, Walter Dexter and Thomas Hatton. New York: The Nonesuch Press. 23 vols., 17,498 pages, and one original plate with each of the 877 sets. $294.

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the banker's daughter, to that strange ruler of an empire of the public imagination, who magnificently entertains at Gadshill and who writes from a lonely but a passionless eminence to his old love Maria, now married, on the occasion of the death of her child or the misfortunes of her husband.

Yet it is still in general true that we get the real story of Dickens—and that perhaps incompletely—only in his novels. It has been complained of Forster's "Life" that the copious correspondence it includes does not really take you far inside Dickens. But it has turned out, as has been said by Mr. J. W. T. Ley in his revised edition of Forster, that Dickens' letters to his other correspondents do not take you very much further. You get more evidence of his amazing energy; you hear him express himself in accents of emotion which have something of the conventionality and staginess of the more disappointing scenes in his novels; but his deeper emotions and judgments were conveyed through those extraordinary symbols which—still largely unexplored by criticism, popular though his novels remain—make the *diable au corps* of his fiction.

EDMUND WILSON

Books in Review

Armchair Strategy

IT'S THE FAVORITE indoor sport these days. Knowing less than Frank Sullivan's cliché expert, Mr. Arbuthnot, about the subject, how many of us spend valuable hours in learned discourse on what the British ought to do, on how General Gamelin must have something up his sleeve, on what the hidden military significances of the Russo-German pact may be. A year ago we armchair strategists (and I was one of them) were telling the world owlishly that a Franco victory in Spain would enable Mussolini-Hitler to put the pincers on France, cut the British lifeline at Gibraltar and give German submarines an advanced base for Atlantic depredations. Apparently we were wrong; Spain has played no visible part as yet in the Second World War. Yet, right at this moment, we armchair strategists are telling each other what Stalin is up to, and what this particular war portends for the British Empire, democracy, government debts, private property, et cetera et cetera. You'd think we'd learn. But we never do.

We might have been warned by the fate of prophets back in 1914-18. In those days certain wise birds said the war couldn't last very long. Germany, it seemed, lacked reliable sources of nitrate, needed for explosives; therefore, she must lose. But a German named Haber had discovered a way of getting nitrates from the air; hence Germany had no need of Chilean sources. . . . Three months ago a number of us were writing articles explaining that Germany's economy must crack under the strain of a prolonged war. . . . But then the Russians upset all calculations by signing an economic pact with Hitler, and Mussolini had the sense to remain neutral, a window for Germany upon the world. How little we know, how little we know!

With this background of invincible ignorance, I now set out blithely to review "Military Strength of the Powers," [1] by Max Werner. The author is "a noted military authority who cannot use his own name because of the possible reflection on relatives in his native land." His book was written in 1938. As a test of the pseudonymous Mr. Werner's competence, let us turn to his chapter called "Poland Between Two Camps." Good heavens, we say, the man's clairvoyant! Here he was telling us a year ago that Polish cavalry would prove useless against either the Nazis or the Red Army. "Polish military strategy," so Mr. Werner wrote, "stresses the importance of maneuvering and offensive capacity. It cannot be denied that its ideas and plans are enterprising, but they have very little material basis. . . . Such maneuvering and offensive strategy pursued by Poland would be ineffective and aimless today. It might be possible against Lithuania or Rumania, but not against the Soviet Union or Germany. If such strategy is used against a numerically superior enemy equipped with modern offensive weapons, an enemy such as Poland has both in the West and in the East, it must lead straight to a catastrophe. . . ."

Mr. Werner, then, knows his stuff. But hold on, there! Turning to his chapter on "Germany and a War on Several Fronts," we find Mr. Werner saying: "We have seen Groner's solution: an understanding with Russia which would relieve Germany politically and militarily, and permit her to wage war in the West undisturbed. The advent of National Socialism in Germany, if nothing else, makes this solution impossible." It has made it so impossible, in fact, that it was the very thing that happened to come about. Mr. Werner, then, is no more infallible than the rest of us; indeed, his book has a distinct flavor of collective-security propaganda, which makes one dubious about his Russian chapters (five out of a total of fifteen). Not that Mr. Werner's figures are false; they check, in good part, with the figures produced by Hanson Baldwin, Major Eliot and other "experts." The imponderables, however, may be weighted badly. Mr. Werner's estimate of Russia's industrial potential is many, many notches above the estimate implied in Boris Souvarine's biography of Stalin. I don't happen to know how trustworthy Souvarine is. But neither do I know anything about Mr. Werner's sources of information. Having some regard for facts, I can only throw up my hands.

If we detach Mr. Werner's figures from his antiquated collective-security pattern, we discover a number of frightening things. His opinion of German army mechanization is extremely high; he tells us of railway trucks that roll along German roads independent of both locomotives and rails, and of tanks that roll along the German railway lines independent of locomotives. The Russians, too, have motorized their army in such a way as to make it independ-

[1] Military Strength of the Powers, by Max Werner. Translated by Edward Fitzgerald. New York: Modern Age Books. 334 pages. 95 cents.

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ent of rails and locomotives. When Mr. Werner was writing, he assumed that Russians and Germans would be on opposite sides, and that Germany would probably lose because of her "strategy of defective endurance." But now that the USSR is supporting the Nazis, at least tacitly? On the basis of Mr. Werner's figures, the most that France and Britain can hope for is a stalemate on the western front.

But, at this point, one begins to wonder about things. What has Stalin to gain by sticking to Nazi Germany until the end? If he has the power which Mr. Werner says he has, he would certainly not use it to make Hitler boss of western Europe and the British colonies—not, at any rate, if he is in his right mind. Geneviève Tabouis has already told readers of The New Republic that henceforward Stalin will be calling the tune. If Mr. Werner is wrong about Soviet strength, then Mme. Tabouis is probably wrong too: Stalin may be trading his support for a decade of help from German technicians. But if Mr. Werner is right, then we may expect events to unroll this way: Stalin will pick up enough territory in eastern Europe to render both Leningrad and the Ukraine impregnable, then he will impose a general peace on his own terms. How will this peace be forced? First, Hitler will be compelled to get in line by a hint that maybe the Red Army might like a long march to the west, against Berlin. Then, with Hitler in his pocket, the French and the British will be faced with threats of a full-out Soviet-Nazi-Japanese-Italian war against the West, the British Middle East and the British Orient.

But here I go indulging in armchair strategy again. My faith in my predictions is no better than Mr. Werner's estimate of Russian might. And that estimate may be 100-percent right, or 100-percent wrong. The moral for the United States is, "Trust nobody and keep your powder dry."

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Three Revolutions

They That Take the Sword, by Nicholas Kalashnikoff. New York: Harper and Brothers. $3.

THIS VERY LONG and very inexpert autobiographical novel states the viewpoint of the Russian socialist revolutionary, a political type now eliminated from history. Mr. Kalashnikoff takes us back to the time when the bourgeois in Russia had to fight for the right to be bourgeois. Sergei Kuskov, the hero of the novel, was a terrorist. That is to say, Sergei was a bourgeois individual without the sanction of a bourgeois state. The competition, nationalism and war, which are characteristic of the bourgeois state, appeared in Sergei Kuskov (under the rule of the Tsar) as anarchy, egoism and terrorism.

The life story of Sergei Kuskov is the history of three revolutions, a world war and exile. Before 1905, Sergei was a terrorist. After 1905, when it became clear that the overthrow of the Tsar might mean the dictatorship of the workers and peasants, Sergei became convinced that his former activities had been anti-social. In 1914, accordingly, Sergei became a nationalist. In 1917, Sergei blossomed as a democrat *à la* Kerensky. In 1918, after the October Revolution, Sergei became a White Guard. Finally, upon the collapse of Kolchak, Sergei got fed up with it all, and betook himself to the United States.

No doubt all these doings with their subsequent sayings and thinkings entitle an author to seven hundred pages. Unfortunately, Mr. Kalashnikoff seems to have modeled his literary style on the pre-Garnett translations from the Russian. "They That Take the Sword" does not succeed in doing for the landlords and capitalists of old Russia what Miss Mitchell did for the slave-owners of old America —it fails to romanticize the lost cause; but it does succeed in delineating it, and in describing the process by which the bourgeois terrorists of the 1900's became the bourgeois "democrats" of 1917. The artlessness of Mr. Kalashnikoff actually gives a more understandable portrait of bourgeois terrorism than the art of Dostoevsky or Conrad. Pruned and edited, the novel would have been really interesting.

MICHAEL SAYERS

Stalin as Satan

Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism, by Boris Souvarine. New York: Alliance Book Corporation (Longmans, Green and Company). 704 pages. $4.50.
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU. New York: International Publishers. 376 pages. $2.

TO BE CAUGHT in Yosemite Valley on the day of the outbreak of the Second Imperialist War was bad enough. I had deserved as much for poor timing in prediction. But my chagrin at this was as nothing compared to the misery of spirit still in store during the course of US 50, 30 and 20 across the continent. The gloom which soon enveloped me was due neither to the war, nor to the bleakness of the Great Open Spaces, nor to my wife's driving (always above reproach), nor yet to the antics of the offspring in the back seat (they read funny papers and Oz books or wrestled with one another in quiet desperation). My melancholia sprang solely from my unhappy decision to abandon vacationing and improve my mind by reading advance copies of two new books.

From the thicker one I anticipated hilarity, for I recalled that after Munich Boris Souvarine in Das Neue Tagebuch (Paris) had explained Stalin's "refusal" to defend Czecho-Slovakia on the ground that thirty or forty million Russians had recently starved to death. Now he had written what the publishers termed "The Definitive Biography." My hopes were heightened by the blurbs on the back jacket: "Indispensable . . . a must book" (Ferdinand Lundberg); "Indispensable . . . fascinating . . . scrupulously honest and conscientious" (Max Eastman); "nothing short of brilliant . . . cannot be recommended too strongly" (James T. Farrell); "perhaps *the* classic biography of Stalin" (Eugene Lyons). With such praise from such sources, I prepared myself for something at least comparable to Ossendowsky's "Lenin: God of the Godless," which reached the heights in the earlier imaginative literature on the Russian Revolution.

Fellow travelers will appreciate my anguish at the initial discovery in Eureka (Nevada) that Boris had nothing to offer on the sex life of Stalin save an allegation of suicide with regard to the death of Mrs. Stalin. Even this, it seems,

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was due to politics, not lechery—"suicide being the only possible manifestation of a sincere opinion under Stalin." By "Little America" (mid-Wyoming) it was clear that Souvarine had nothing new to offer on Stalin's unsex life. And by Ogalalla (Nebraska) I was obliged to resign myself to the fact that B.S. was not even writing about Stalin but about all sorts of other people connected with the intricate inner schisms of the CPSU. Over a thousand erudite but unimaginative miles I struggled in vain to discover the B.S. viewpoint. It smelled faintly of Trotskyism. Souvarine was expelled from the Comintern Executive and from the French CP in 1926 for "counter-revolutionary propaganda." But no Trotskyite is Boris, for in central Iowa he damned Trotsky and other figures of the Right and Left Opposition with the same sweeping impartiality that he displayed toward all Soviet officials.

Not until Angola (Indiana) did I find, in the last two hundred pages, a meager reward for long waiting. For here, belatedly, Souvarine confessed his prejudices and warmed to his subject. Stalin—"this repulsive character"—has an "alcoholic heritage," a club foot, a lame arm, an inferiority complex and a persecution mania. He is a sadist, a fool and a failure. Lacking all originality, he inherited his devilish system of oppression from Lenin and Trotsky. His savagery is a natural consequence of the Soviet system. He is Ivan the Terrible, Nicholas I and Genghis Khan. His regime is criminality and depravity. "Russia under the Soviets was not so much reminiscent of pre-revolutionary Tsarism, which was a worm-eaten autocracy, a despotism tempered by corruption and lightened by certain tolerances and relatively liberal customs. It was more like Russia in a more barbarous age." The Five Year Plan? A ghastly failure. (With amazing foresight Souvarine predicted its failure in 1930.) Industrialization? A fraud. Collectivization? A crime. Living standards? "The general balance sheet is disastrous. . . . All is for the worst in the worst of all possible dictatorships." Increased population? Thirty-two million people are missing. (Authorities cited: W. Krivitsky, Harry Lang and The New York American.) The trials? Framed-up murders.

In short, B. S. feels about Stalinism, and about communism in general, as Calvin Coolidge's preacher did about sin: he's against it. This not uncommon attitude could have been stated in something under 700 pages with considerable resultant saving of paper and printer's ink. But "authoritative" books must be big. This hefty tome will doubtless become *the* authoritative work for all the enemies of Stalinism throughout the world. And Stalin will doubtless continue to outwit and outshoot his enemies, chiefly because they prefer fictions to facts.

Some of the relevant facts are to be found in the new official history of the CPSU, recommended (with qualifications) for highways through Ohio. This anonymous work is a succinct and readable survey of the Party's rise, development and achievements. But orthodoxy demands its fictions no less than heterodoxy. Thus in Geneva (Ohio) Trotsky and Tukhachevsky lost the Polish war of 1920 and in Geneva (New York) the trial defendants, who are repeatedly referred to as "villains," "traitors," "gang of assassins," "enemies of the people," "dregs of humanity," etc., are represented as having plotted against the Soviet power for twenty years. Though the history, running through the Finger Lakes area, includes 1937, there is almost no treatment of the "Popular Front" line which has since been buried. But in Skaneateles (New York) I traced the development of a hypothesis which Stalin's strategy has since made reality: "The Second Imperialist War . . . is being waged against the capitalist interests of Great Britain, France and the U.S.A."

This reality has made Stalin an object of almost universal execration among liberals and conservatives alike in the capitalist democracies. Chamberlain sought to use fascism to destroy the USSR and failed. Stalin, having outwitted both Hitler and Chamberlain, is now using fascism to destroy the capitalist democracies. *Ergo,* runs the argument, Stalin is a perfidious villain and has double-crossed everybody—since it is the manifest duty of a Communist dictator to save the democracies from their own folly and to prevent capitalism from destroying itself. In reality, despite Souvarine's denial, Stalin has read Machiavelli and has become the most astute diplomat of the century. His sole political interests are defense of the USSR and propagation of world revolt. The war between the bourgeois powers which he helped to precipitate will enhance the security of the Soviet Union and, in its inevitable aftermath, promote social revolution. The process is unpleasant. Stalin's method is satanic. But history, strangely enough, is written by the survivors. Among contemporary leaders, the man in the Kremlin bids fair to be the only survivor.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

The Flouring of New England

The Yankee Cook Book, edited by Imogene Wolcott. New York: Coward-McCann. 414 pages. $2.50.

CULINARILY SPEAKING, America is a unit. Throughout the country there is a distinct American cooking, recognizable wherever one goes. It is good New England food, found in Florida as well as California and all points between. True, sectional foods exist in every one of the states—but a standard cookery found all over is that out of New England. When the natives migrated, they took their kitchen customs with them. The result is best recognized in the Thanksgiving dinner with its traditional trimmings, found at every good American table. In "The Yankee Cook Book" you will find New England at its best.

This fine cook book seems to contain the essence of the New England people, and makes my mouth water on every page. There is one simple reader-test for a good cook book. Does it make your mouth water? If it does, the book is a good one. This "Yankee Cook Book" has a number of virtues besides its full, well balanced collection of excellent recipes. Scattered throughout, and without interfering with the main kitchen purpose, are odds and ends of New England lore, plus a number of longer gustatory outpourings of several food-loving natives.

There is a rare and noble dish which I found at my mother's table and nowhere else. It's corn pudding, and I've hunted for the recipe many places and actually found it—in this book. It's a real treat.

Out of Maine comes the famous recipe for the cooking of coot:

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Place the bird in a kettle of water with a red building brick free of mortar and blemishes. Parboil the coot and brick together for 3 hours. Pour off water, fill the kettle again and parboil for 3 hours. Once more throw off the water, refill the kettle, and this time let the coot and brick simmer together overnight. In the morning throw away the coot and eat the brick.

For your discomfort I list here some of the more pleasant foods: Quahog Stew, Cape Cod Clam Pie, Trout Over a Campfire, Yankee Pot Roast, Spoon Cakes, Indian Pudding, Popdoddle Cake, Sweet Pickled Apples.

Here is a happy conglomeration of recipes—some three centuries old, others from the kitchens of contemporary New Englanders. The book is really very complete, touching on the better things of the kitchen, such as soups, chowders, stews, fish, game, gems, puddings, preserves, sweetmeats, herbs and all the more common dishes. It makes pleasant reading, though somewhat disturbing, for you're bound to find some recipe that brings back fond memories. The only jarring note is a Quiz, which is neither here nor there in the making of good food.

A. DILWORTH FABER

New Books: A Reader's List

IN DEFENSE OF FRANCE, by Edouard Daladier (Doubleday, Doran, $2.50). Terse and gloomy are these appeasement and pre-war speeches by the Premier of France, who repeatedly asserts that his country wants the peace of free men, liberty to defend her rights, and "nothing else." His ancestors of 1789 wanted more than that, knowing that a free nation cannot be safe when it encourages the enslavement of its neighbors.

LAND OF THE SOVIETS, by Nicholas Mikhailov (Lee Furman, $2.50). A well written, richly illustrated and highly informative handbook of the USSR, by one of the foremost Soviet geographers.

ATTACK FROM WITHIN, by Elwyn Jones (Penguin Books, 25 cents). The nature, methods and extent of Nazi penetration into foreign countries. Includes a survey of the Rome-Berlin Axis and interior conditions in Germany. The sections devoted to Russia's position as a Peace Front ally are now dated, but on the whole this is a most useful pocket-size guide.

MURDER AND MORE MURDER, by William Roughead (Sheridan House, $2.50). The eminent Scottish authority on crime describes eight more murders. He is, as always, in splendid form, and in "The Ardlamont Mystery" and "Mrs. Donald's Crime" has put every serious murder fan heavily in his debt.

I LOST MY ENGLISH ACCENT, by C. V. R. Thompson (Putnam's, $2). A breezy account of life in America by a British journalist, who finds all the standard things to like and dislike about us. Warning to consumers: contains artificial coloring matter.

Science

ATOMS IN ACTION: The World of Creative Physics, by George Russell Harrison (Morrow, $3.50). High praise to Professor Harrison for having written one of the most intelligent and stimulating accounts of what science actually has done and can do for the average man and woman. Chapters on radio, television, aviation, X-rays, photography,

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PREHISTORIC LIFE, by Percy E. Raymond (Harvard, $5). The material usually found in textbooks on Paleontology presented in more popular form by an American authority on the subject. Outlines the course of evolution from the earliest fossil forms to *homo sapiens*.

O CANAAN! by Waters E. Turpin (Doubleday, Doran, $2.50). A novel that tells how Southern Negroes are absorbed by Chicago. Joe Benson grandly takes charge of his flock, leading them from the cottonfields to the monotonous roar of the city. Mr. Turpin writes about his own people with keen perception, in a smoothly personal style.

VERMONT VALLEY, by Walter Hard (Harcourt, Brace, $2.50). Mr. Hard's second book of anecdotes in free verse is as good as his "Mountain Township" in picturing the Spartan life of shrewd New Englanders who believe that "grin and bear it" is a Biblical text.

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Alfred A. Knopf announces the establishment of three annual literary fellowships of $1,200 each—one for a work of fiction, one for a biography and one for a history. Any citizen of the United States or Canada writing in the English language is eligible for an award. The actual fellowship fund is not an advance against royalties—which will be on the usual basis—but an outright grant to be paid to the winners in twelve equal monthly instalments. Prospective applicants should write to Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 501 Madison Avenue, New York City, for further details.

Creative Writing, published at 152 West Schiller Street, Chicago, will be glad to consider stories, articles or poems—but especially articles. As yet they cannot pay for contributions.

Contributors

HAROLD J. LASKI, the distinguished British political scientist, is a member of the faculty of the London School of Economics.

MOTIER HARRIS FISHER lives in Oberlin, Ohio.

GRANVILLE HICKS, for a number of years an editor of The New Masses, is the author of "The Great Tradition," "John Reed" and "I Like America." He formerly taught English at Rensselaer, but was dismissed as a result of his political connections.

EDMUND WILSON, the author of "Axel's Castle," "The Triple Thinkers" and other books in many fields, is now writing "To the Finland Station," in which he studies the effort to carry historical theories into action.

MICHAEL SAYERS is an Irish short-story writer and playwright. He is living in Norwalk, Connecticut, and working on a novel.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN is professor of Political Science at Williams College. His most recent book is "Europe on the Eve."

A. DILWORTH FABER is a journalist who used to be cook on a tugboat. He now keeps thin, so he says, by hunting edible food.

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